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Executive Summary
There are over 800,000 hazardous materials (hazmat) shipments over the nation’s roads each day. 
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), terrorist activity related to the 
transportation of hazardous materials represents a significant threat to public safety and the nation’s 
critical infrastructure. Specifically, the federal government has identified the government’s inability to 
track hazmat shipments on a real-time basis as a significant security vulnerability.
In 2004, the U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) completed a study to 
determine if “smart truck” technology such as GPS tracking, wireless modems, panic buttons, and on-
board computers could be used to enhance hazmat shipment security. The FMCSA study concluded 
that “smart truck” technology will be highly effective in protecting hazmat shipments from terrorists. 
The FMCSA study also concluded that “smart truck” technology deployment will produce a huge 
security benefit and an overwhelmingly positive return on investment for hazmat carriers.
The FMCSA study led to the U.S. Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Hazmat Truck 
Security Pilot (HTSP). This congressionally mandated pilot program was undertaken to demonstrate if 
a hazmat truck tracking center was feasible from a technology and systems perspective. The HTSP
project team built a technology prototype of a hazmat truck tracking system to show that “smart 
truck” technology could be crafted into an effective and efficient system for tracking hazmat 
shipments.  The HTSP project team also built the Universal Communications Interface – the XML 
gateway for hazmat carriers to use to provide data to a centralized truck tracking center. 
In August 2007, Congress enacted the 9/11 Act (PL110-53) that directs TSA to develop a program -
consistent with the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot - to facilitate the tracking of motor carrier shipments 
of security-sensitive materials.  In June 2008, TSA took a major step forward in establishing a national 
hazmat security program by issuing guidance for shipments of Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive 
Materials (HSSMs), the riskiest shipments from a security perspective.  TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM guidance 
includes Security Action Items which specify security measures – including vehicle tracking – that TSA 
believes are prudent security measures for shippers and carriers to follow.  Compliance with TSA’s Tier 
1 HSSM guidance is voluntary but TSA is expected to issue regulations based on the Tier 1 HSSM 
Security Action Items that will make compliance mandatory.  
Establishment of a Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking center is critical to implementation of a Tier 1 HSSM 
regulatory program based on the Security Action items by TSA.  The HTSP technology prototype was 
an excellent first step toward an operational Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system, however, it falls far 
short of what TSA needs in an operational system.  
This deliverable examines the “gaps” between the HTSP technology prototype and an operational Tier 
1 HSSM truck tracking system.  It draws upon the work of an Independent Verification and Validation 
contractor that evaluated the HTSP technology prototype.  It also examines TSA needs related to 
implementation of a regulatory program based on Tier 1 HSSM Security Action Items.
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1.0 The TSA Hazmat Truck Security Pilot Technology 
After the FMCSA finished its Hazmat Safety and Security Technology Field Operational 
Test (FOT) in November 2004, Congress directed the 
Administration (TSA) to undertake the TSA 
project. The purpose of the pilot project was to
tracking center was feasible from a technology and systems perspective and to 
determine if existing commercial truck tr
intelligence centers and first responders. 
The contract for the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot program was awarded to 
Dynamics Advanced Information Systems 
Work under the contract was completed April 2008.  The contract had three tasks.
1. Develop and demonstrate a prototype for a centralized truck tracking center that 
could be used to continually track truck locations and load types.   The truck 
tracking center would also be
government intelligence operations center, state, local, and Federal law 
enforcement agencies and first responders.
2. Develop and demonstrate a non
communication protocols that would allow alerts and tracking information to be 
transmitted from all commercially available tracking systems to a prototype truck 
tracking center.
3. Analyze the feasibility and benefits of applying a risk
and managing hazmat security risks and incidents involving trucks on U.S. 
highways; demonstrate the capability of using the Hazmat Truck Security System 
(HTSS), with a commercial-off-the
and conduct a public showcase demonstration of the entire HTSS.
The Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP) program demonstrated that a truck tracking 
system is feasible from a technology and systems perspective.
1.1 What are the building blocks of a hazmat truck tracking center?
Figure 1.1 presents a general schematic of a hazmat truck tracking center.  As 
indicated in Figure 1.1, six basic functional components 
to build a hazmat truck tracking system.
1. An XML-based interface with fleet tracking vendor
tracking center.
2. A web interface (portal) allows shippers and carriers to interact with the truck 
tracking center (registration, e-manifest, e
data.
3. The hazmat truck tracking operations 
actionable information for government agencies.
4. A risk (business rules) engine
shipments between gate-out and gate
5. Business process workflow processing and data processing
displayed on desktops and workstations
6. A communications infrastructure
government action agencies, hazmat carriers,
1
Prototype
U.S. Transportation Security 
Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP) 
demonstrate that a hazmat truck 
acking systems can interface with government 
General 
(GDAIS) of Buffalo, NY in October 2005.  
used to coordinate incident response with a 
-proprietary universal interface or set of 
-based approach to identifying 
-shelf (COTS) rules-based risk assessment tool; 
– or building blocks - are needed 
s feeds data to a hazmat truck 
-route) and to submit/view corporate 
center merges data flowing into it to create 
provides dynamic risk profiling of hazmat 
-in to identify “risky” shipments..
results are 
in a truck tracking operations center.
supports efficient interaction/consultation with 
and first responders.
Congress directed TSA to 
undertake the Hazmat Truck 
Security Pilot project.  TSA 
demonstrated that a truck 
tracking system is feasible from a 
technology and systems 
perspective. 
The building blocks of a hazmat 
truck tracking center are:
1. an XML –based 
communications interface;
2. a portal interface for hazmat 
shippers and carriers
3. an operations center that 
processes data into 
actionable intelligence;
4. a business rules engine for 
dynamic risk profiling of 
hazmat shipments; 
5. systems to manage business 
workflow and data 
presentation; and
6. a communications 
infrastructure to support 
collaboration with 
government action agencies 
and others.
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Figure 1.1  Building blocks of a hazmat truck tracking center.
1.2 Shippers, carriers, and fleet tracking vendors have to deploy “smart 
truck” technology and submit data to enable a truck tracking center.
A hazmat truck tracking center is dependent on data flow from shippers, carriers and 
fleet tracking vendors.  Data is the raw product that a truck tracking center converts into 
actionable intelligence.  Efficient and timely processing of data gives the center the
ability to answer the questions presented in Figure 2.1 and allows it to effectively 
support government action agencies when a transportation security incident is declared.
However, a truck tracking center will fail unless smart truck technology is widely 
deployed and shippers, carriers and fleet tracking vendors submit data to the truck 
tracking center.  Currently, there is no regulatory requirement that hazmat shippers 
deploy smart truck technology or submit data to a truck tracking center. 1
Industry groups have advocated voluntary measures for hazmat technology deployment 
and data reporting.  However, voluntary industry measures – while conceptually 
appealing – rarely work.  The FMCSA FOT study acknowledged the problem of industry-
led voluntary programs by suggesting that “government intervention” (e.g. regulations)
will be needed to stimulate smart truck technology deployment and data reporting.  This
argument for “government intervention” is buttressed by DHS’s recent experience in its 
                                                          
1 The exceptions are munitions and radioactive material shipments.  However, these shipments represent only a small fraction of 
the total number of high-risk hazmat shipments in the U.S.  
To succeed, a hazmat truck 
tracking center needs data. 
Hazmat carriers have to deploy 
smart truck technology, and 
shippers, carriers, and truck 
tracking vendors must submit 
data to the tracking center.
3
efforts to beef up security at chemical production plants in urban areas.  In that case, an 
industry-led voluntary initiative to upgrade chemical plant security resulted in such a 
tepid industry response that DHS had to take the program back and issue regulations to 
require chemical companies to institute security programs.
1.3 The HTSP technology prototype design reflected assumptions about 
technology deployment and data reporting. 
Figure 1.2 shows the timeline of events surrounding the HTSP project.  The HTSP 
project began in October 2005 and ended April 2008.  
Figure 1.2  The HTSP project began October 2005 and ended April 2008.
The FMCSA’s Field Operations Test was completed a year before the HTPS project 
began.  While the FOT project report suggested that regulations should drive technology 
deployment and data reporting – especially in light of positive ROI generated by smart 
truck technology – the time was not right in late 2005 for a regulatory push by federal 
agencies.  The responsibility for regulation of hazmat shipments was in transition from 
DOT to DHS, and a number of thorny technical and regulatory uncertainties existed.  
The results of the FMCSA field tests on vehicle immobilization systems and untethered
trailer tracking systems were not yet available, and the concept of operations for a 
hazmat truck tracking center had been only mildly developed in the FOT.  Moreover, 
there was a great deal of uncertainty about the role that regulations would play in 
securing the nation’s hazmat supply chain.
It is unlikely that hazmat trading 
partners will voluntarily submit 
data to a truck tracking center.
In late 2005 when the HTSP 
began, there was uncertainty 
about technology and regulatory 
issues.
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Even though the HTSP prototype’s functionality was limited by industry participation, the 
HTSP pilot was highly successful.  It proved that a hazmat truck tracking center is
technically feasible and that smart truck technology can be crafted into an effective and 
efficient system for tracking hazmat shipments.  However, the pilot fell far short of 
advancing a regulatory and implementation framework that would allow TSA to move 
forward with its hazmat truck tracking program.  This is not a criticism of the HTSP pilot 
or the work done on it – development of a framework for implementing TSA’s hazmat 
truck tracking program was not part of the mission of the project team.
1.4 The HTSP technology prototype used an XML communications interface 
based on the IEEE 1512 standards. 2.
The HTSP contractor was given the following direction by TSA for constructing a 
messaging interface for the HTSP.
“Develop and demonstrate a set of communication protocols that shall allow alerts 
and tracking information to be transmitted from commercial in-use truck tracking 
systems to a prototype truck tracking center in order to enhance the ability of state, 
local, and federal authorities to identify and respond to Transportation Security 
Incidents (TSIs).  The interface shall also be capable of receiving and processing 
information from all other commercially available truck tracking systems.” 3
Appendix A contains links to TSA Universal Communications Interface design 
documents.  Figure 1.3 illustrates the high-level design for the communications 
interface that was built for the HTSP.  Under this design scenario, fleet tracking vendors 
are required to report data in a form and format consistent with the communications 
standard set by the truck tracking center.
Figure 1.3 Fleet tracking vendors build to a standard communications interface.
The HTSP communications interface was built using the IEEE-1512 Standard for 
Common Incident Management Message Sets for Use by Emergency Management 
Centers (known as the 1512 Base Standard) and the IEEE-1512 Standard for Hazardous 
                                                          
2  Section 4.5.4 is taken from, “Hazmat Truck Security Pilot – Final Report – Objective 3, Communication Interface 
Development and Testing”; April 11, 2008; General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems.
3 A transportation security incident (TSI) is defined by TSA as a security incident resulting in significant loss of life, 
environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption in a particular area (46 USC 701).
The HTSP project was hugely 
successful in that it proved that a 
hazmat truck tracking center is 
feasible from a technology 
perspective.
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Material Incident Management Message Sets for use by Emergency Management Centers 
(known as the 1512.3 Standard). It was also built to conform to the National 
Transportation Communications for ITS Protocol (NTCIP).  
The 1512 Base standard provides messages and data that are common to one or more
members of the 1512 family of standards, which also includes Traffic Incident 
Management (1512.1) and Public Safety Incident Management (1512.2).  IEEE-1512.3 
provides unique messages and data for the communication of hazardous material related 
incident information.
An interface requirements specification (IRS) and an Interface Control Document (ICD) 
were prepared to support the development of the HTSP interface standard.
The design of the UCI is based on a concept of events and alerts with the interface 
receiving and displaying tracking information and specialized alerts. With this in mind, 
the HTSP contractor defined an event to be a specific shipment, from gate-out to gate-
in. A gate-out message indicates the start of the shipment event and a gate-in message 
indicates the end of the shipment event. Position updates for this shipment are then
treated as updates to the shipment event. Other message types, such as panic button 
presses, are treated as alerts associated with the specific shipment event. 
The UCI consists of three IEEE-1512 messages and associated sub-messages.
 Message Type 1 - Incident Description (IDX) message.  The IDX message
allows event data (messages) to be sent to the central truck tracking center 
application. The design of the UCI treats any shipment as an incident or event, with 
the start of the incident being triggered by a gate out indication. The IDX message 
will always contain the following information:
o Incident or Event ID – This is a globally unique identifier that was assigned to 
each incident at gate out.
o Timestamp – This is the time the message was sent to the TTC.
o Event Type – Event type is a standardized list of phrases describing the type of 
event.  The event type may change during the course of an incident. For 
example a shipment being tracked would have an event type of ‘position report’ 
initially. If the driver then hit the panic button, the event type would change to 
‘driver alarm’, while the Incident ID remained the same. Figure 1.4 lists the 
event types that were supported by the HTSP
Figure 1.4 The HTTP communications interface recognizes 18 event types.
shipment off course position report
driver alarm
vehicle hijack
unexpected cargo weight 
change
unexpected cargo 
temperature change
attempted security bypass
automatic vehicle throttle 
down
automatic vehicle stopping
unexpected trailer separation
unauthorized system disabling overdue shipment
entered geo-fence
exited geo-fence accident involving a semi 
trailer
cargo data
location – the reported 
latitude and longitude position 
at the time of the message
emergency contact number 
– the number to call for the 
carrier if an emergency 
situation occurs.
The HTSP communications 
interface was built using IEEE 
1512.3 standards for hazmat 
incidents.
An incident description message 
is used to signal different event 
types including gate out, position 
report, driver alarm, etc.
The UCI processes events and 
alerts associated with events.  An 
event is a specific shipment –
from gate out to gate in. 
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The standard requires that each IDX message contain at least one of four IDX sub-
messages. 
IDX Sub-Message 1 – Cargo Document
The Cargo Documents message is used to convey the information typically found in 
commercial shipping papers.  The Cargo Documents message contains the following 
information: 
o Cargo Vehicle ID – An ID number that associates the cargo documents to a cargo vehicle. 
o Cargo Unit ID – An ID number that associates the cargo documents to a cargo unit. 
o Material ID Number – The UN number assigned to the material being shipped.  This is also 
the placard number(s) that must be displayed on the truck.
o Quantity – The quantity of the material being shipped.  Some of the more common 
accepted values are grams, kilograms, ounces, pounds, tons, fluid ounces, gallons, 
milliliters and liters.  
IDX Sub-Message 2 – Cargo Vehicle
The Cargo Vehicle message is used to describe the vehicle associated with the incident.  
The Cargo Vehicle message can be used to identify any type of vehicle that could haul 
cargo.  The Cargo Vehicle message contains the following information: 
o Cargo Vehicle ID – An ID number assigned to the vehicle. 
o Cargo Unit ID’s – ID numbers assigned to cargo units associated with the vehicle.
o Vehicle Information – Provides the basic information to help in identifying a vehicle.  The 
UCI is using make, color, license plate and registration number.
o Driver Information – Provides information to identify a vehicles driver.  Currently, the 
interface supports the following information; the name and address of the driver and the 
name and address of the company the driver works for.  The HTSP contracted suggested to 
the IEEE1512 committee that it consider changing the driver information to use the GJXDM 
person model.  If adopted this change would include social security number, date of birth 
and detailed driver’s license information.
IDX Sub-Message 3 – Cargo Units
The Cargo Units message is used to describe the trailer or unit associated with a cargo 
vehicle.  The Cargo Units message contains the following information: 
o Cargo Vehicle ID – The ID of the vehicle associated with the cargo unit, if one exists. 
o Cargo Unit ID – the cargo units assigned ID. 
o Contents – If a trailer is un-tethered, the contents of the trailer can be described here.
IDX Sub-Message 4 – Resource Assignment
The Resource Assignment message is used to provide origin and destination information 
for the vehicle.  The message contains the following information: 
o Origin, Destination – Provided the ability to describe the origin and/or destination.  
Currently, we are only asking for city, state due to carrier reluctance to provide more 
information.  The interface can support a full mailing address. 
o In addition this message is capable of receiving detailed GPS information, such as speed 
and heading, if it were available and of interest to TSA.
 Message Type 2 – Close Message.  The Close Message is used to indicate that a 
given event has been closed from the perspective of the center sending the 
message. This message will be sent when a gate in event occurs or when a truck 
tracking center operator manually closes an incident.
 Message Type 3 - Watch For Message.  The Watch For message was added to 
the UCI to support risk-based profiling of hazmat shipments. UCI data is provided to 
The incident description message 
is used to describe a vehicle’s 
cargo (type, quantity) .
The incident description message 
is used to describe a vehicle’s 
identification and provide 
information on the driver.
The close message indicates gate 
in status for the shipment – i.e. 
that the trip has ended.
The incident description message 
is used to describe a vehicle’s 
cargo units including trailers.
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a risk analysis system.  In the case of the HTSP, a commercial product, Fdfolio™, served 
as a business rules/risk engine for the HTSP.  The risk analysis system analyzes the data 
and assigns a risk score based on different factors, such as the material being shipped 
or the vehicles location. The risk analysis system then sends the Watch For message to 
the UCI. The message contains the following information:
o A hyperlink to the risk system’s web page associated with the reported score. This provides 
an operator the ability to directly view and update the reasons for a risk assessment.
o A risk level score that provides a numerical value for assessing a shipments risk that 
corresponds to the DHS threat levels.
o A quick summary of the reasons for the risk score.
o The recommended instructions associated with a particular risk score.
1.5 The HTSP’s Transportation Event Analysis and Management System 
processes and displays event-based data. 4
The HTSP’s Transportation Event Analysis and Management System (TEAMS) is an 
event-based system that stores and displays event-based information received in 
messages from transportation-related systems and sends notifications when messages 
identifying new events are received.  TEAMS automatically collects data in real-time 
from commercial fleet tracking vendors.  Fleet tracking vendors that participated in the 
HTSP included Qualcomm, PeopleNet, and Safefreight.  
The HTSP contractor developed a basic version of TEAMS prior to its work for TSA on the 
Hazmat Truck Security Pilot project.  TEAMS – as it stood prior to modification for the 
TSA project – had the following functionality.
 TEAMS is an event-based system that stores and displays event-based information 
received in messages from transportation-related systems and sends notifications 
when messages identifying new events are received. TEAMS displays event 
information in textual, pictorial, and geospatial formats. 
 TEAMS uses a web service to receive event-based XML messages. When a message 
is received that contains information about an event not in the TEAMS database, a 
new event is created in the database. When a message is received that contains 
information about an event already existing in the TEAMS database, the information 
for that event is updated in the TEAMS database.  
 TEAMS provides human-readable output in HTML so that a user only requires a web 
browser to view the current state of events. Thus, authorized users can access 
TEAMS anywhere a computer and internet connectivity is available with appropriate 
security (VPN). TEAMS controls access by authenticating users based on user IDs 
and passwords. Event information is presented in textual and pictorial format. Event 
location is presented in geospatial format. 
 TEAMS uses ESRI-formatted map data on which event location is overlaid. The map 
display can be controlled using zoom and scroll controls. 
 TEAMS uses email to notify users of new events. Email messages can be sent to 
desktop computers, handheld computers, and SMS- enabled cellular telephones.
 TEAMS is a Java-based application that utilizes a web server, a J2EE application 
server (currently SUN), and a relational database (currently Microsoft SQL Server) 
to process, store, and present event information. TEAMS can be easily modified to 
process, store, and present any event-based information. 
The HTPS contractor made the following enhancements to TEAMS to meet TSA’s HTSP 
objectives.
 User interface enhancements.  The TEAMS user interface was enhanced to support 
unique needs of the HAZMAT truck tracking application.  New data views and 
functionality were added.
                                                          
4 Sections 2.5 – 2.11 are taken from, “Hazmat Truck Security Pilot – Final Report – Objective 2, Truck Tracking Center Prototype”;
April 11, 2008; General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems.
The watch for message is 
generated by the HTSP’s risk 
engine to alert the operator that 
a significant event raising the 
risk profile of the shipment has 
occurred.
TEAMS automatically collects 
data in real-time from 
commercial truck tracking 
vendors.  
The HTSP’s Transportation Event 
Analysis and Management 
System (TEAMS) is an event-
based system that stores and 
displays event-based information 
received in messages from 
transportation-related systems.  
vendors.  
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 Modifications to support risk assessment.  TEAMS was enhanced to support working 
in an integrated environment with a risk assessment tool (FDfolio).  These included 
database enhancements, communications enhancements, display enhancements, 
and the ability for users to access the risk assessment tool. 
 Vehicle tracking.  TEAMS was enhanced to support vehicle tracking including the 
ability to display vehicle history locations graphically.
 Alerting.  TEAMS was enhanced to support the presentation of alerts needed to 
notify operators when new events or information are available.
 Access control.  TEAMS was enhanced to provide a mechanism for setting 
passwords and restricting access to authorized users.  
 Material handling guidance.  TEAMS was upgraded to allow TTCP operators to access 
information regarding HAZMAT materials and appropriate emergency responses.
 HAZMAT data storage and display.  TEAMS was upgraded to support the acquisition, 
storage, and display of HAZMAT truck identification and HAZMAT cargo information.
 Access to map overlays.  TEAMS was enhanced to allow access to orthographic 
maps with imagery of locations of interest.
 Geo-fencing.  TEAMS was upgraded to support defining geo-fences by demarcating 
areas within any polygonal shape and determination of when HAZMAT trucks violate 
defined geo-fences.  The capability handles both exclusionary and inclusionary geo-
fences. 
 Local Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) identification.  TEAMS was upgraded to 
present PSAP contact information for an event based on the location of the HAZMAT 
truck in relation to local PSAP jurisdictions. 
 Points of interest.  TEAMS was upgraded to provide determination of and access to 
points of interest (e.g., schools, hospitals, power plants) near an incident. 
 Current weather.  TEAMS was enhanced to provide access to current weather 
information in the vicinity of HAZMAT security events.
1.6 The communications architecture for the HTSP technology prototype 
supports efficient dataflow between system components.
A key system feature that TSA required in the HTSP was the ability of the prototype to 
share critical information across disparate systems in real time.  Figure 1.5 illustrates 
the communications architecture that was deployed in the pilot program.  The system 
uses the UCI for data communications between the truck tracking centers, TEAMS and 
FDfolio™.  The interfaces are event-based.  When a new event, either an alert or 
position update is generated by a connected truck tracking system, FDfolio™ provides an 
updated assessment of risk and TEAMS determines whether a geo-fence violation has 
occurred and updates displays.  Truck tracking center operators and TSA Watch Officers 
(i.e., TSA person responsible for managing alerts) are able to use TEAMS to “drill down” 
to view FDfolio™ displays allowing review and management of rules that may have 
created a risk-based alert.   Center operators and Watch Officers are also able to provide 
PSAPs with secure access to TEAMS displays in support of emergency response actions. 
1.7 The HTSP technology prototype was built around a “concept of 
operations” workflow.
A functional block diagram of TEAMS is presented in Figure 1.6.  It shows the data type 
and flow through the system from the data source to system users.   This is a high level 
look at the system from an information management perspective.  
A Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes the characteristics of a system from the 
users’ point of view. For the HTSP, the Concept of Operations specifies the operational 
requirements for implementing a centralized truck tracking center and coordination and
Additional functionality was 
added to the basic TEAMS 
product to adapt it to use as a 
hazmat truck tracking tool.
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Figure 1.5 HTSP Prototype Communications Architecture
Figure 1.6  TEAMS exchanges data with other components of the 
prototype.
Figure 1.7 TEAMS supports the HTSP’s “concept of 
operations” workflow.
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management of Transportation Security Incidents (TSIs).  As illustrated in Figure 1.7,
the basic ConOps adopted for the HTSP was as follows:
1. A Universal Communications Interface message is received by the truck tracking 
center.  The truck tracking center processes the message to determine if it is a 
routine position report message or an alert message.  The message is also 
forwarded to the risk assessment engine, whether it is a routine message or an 
alert, to be assessed based on its data content
2. If the message is an alert, or if the risk score causes an alert, the truck tracking 
center operator contacts the TSA watch officer by phone to make sure TSA is aware 
of the situation.
3. The truck tracking center operator creates a three way conference call by calling the 
carrier, using a number provided by the carrier.
4. If the carrier is aware of the situation and it is deemed not to be a TSI, then the 
process of resolving the event is left to the carrier’s normal response plans.
5. If the carrier cannot be contacted, or if the carrier is contacted but isn’t sure if the 
event is a security situation, then the tracking center determines the Public Safety 
Answering Point (PSAP) with jurisdiction for the event and includes them in the 
conference call.
6. TSA, the carrier and the PSAP collectively discuss the event to determine if it is a 
security situation or not.  If a TSI is declared then TSA takes over the responsibility 
for handling the event.
The notifications of hazmat transportation events are termed “alerts”.  TEAMS receives 
data from fleet tracking vendors and carrier/shipper systems through the UCI.  TEAMS 
uses this data to recognize and initiate an alert when a new incident is identified. An 
alert mechanism is included in the TEAMS application and is employed to notify the truck 
tracking center operators, and other designated workstations (i.e., the DHS TSOC) of 
the new incident. The truck tracking center operator uses TEAMS to view all related 
data, manage the required notifications, log all actions associated with the event, and 
monitor the TSI status until closed.
The TEAMS application is the primary user interface to truck tracking center data.  The 
UCI collects data from various truck tracking and carrier manifest sources to support 
truck tracking center operations.  Certain data elements collected from the field are used 
to indicate/notify the onset of transportation events which may evolve into a 
transportation security incident (TSI) – such as panic button activation, cargo 
monitoring exception, off route or geo-fence violation.  Notifications may also be 
telephonically called into the truck tracking center by TSA, a carrier, or other 
federal/state/local government agency.
TEAMS is used to implement workflows and specific processes. In TEAMS, alert and 
notification information is presented to the truck tracking center operator on a 
workstation screen. On screen is a list of persons to be notified (i.e., TSA Watch Officer,
carrier contact, Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP), etc.). Each listing provides a 
method(s) of notification, such as telephone call, e-mail, fax, etc. (or any combination of 
these). The TTC System allows for electronic notification via e-mail, cell phone SMS, and 
fax. In TEAMS, a “Contacted/Sent” toggle button is associated with each listed 
person/agency to be notified. When the “Contacted” button is clicked, a check mark 
appears in the box, indicating that a call has been placed to the contact and a record will 
be made of this call in the Action Log. The Action Log contains a complete list of all 
entries made into the system by external systems or users. Similarly, when the “Sent” 
button is clicked the listed electronic notification (e.g., fax or e-mail) message will 
automatically be sent and a record made of the transaction in the Action Log. The user is 
also provided with alternates for additional (adjoining) PSAP notification to ensure that 
entities are notified if the primary contacts are not available. 
Initial transportation event notifications are evaluated through the process described in 
the following paragraph to determine if a TSI should be declared, and what should be an 
The HTSP ConOps plan relies 
heavily on telephonic 
communications.  PSAPs – not 
state agencies – manage local 
response decision-making under 
the plan. 
There is a working definition for 
“transportation security incident” 
but the criteria that TSA and 
others would use to decide if an 
incident should be declared as a 
TSI was not described in the 
HTSP project report.
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appropriate response.  The TTC may help coordinate a public safety response even 
though a TSI is not declared. 
When a new event is received, the truck tracking center operator reviews the data and 
begins the notification process.  In TEAMS, on the TSI Details screen, the “First 
Contacts” section provides all necessary information to contact and notify TSA staff, 
carriers, first responders, and any other entity designated in the procedures established. 
In the same “First Contacts” listing, other contact information, such as office and cell 
phone numbers, is displayed. The dispatcher makes a telephone call to each “Required” 
and “Requested” contact, and logs each successful notification in the TEAMS application. 
1.8 TEAMS is a Java-based server application composed of two major 
components: the user interface and data services.
TEAMS is a Java-based server application, running on the JBoss 2EE server, composed of 
two major components: the user interface and the data services.  For developing the 
TEAMS user interface, JavaServer Faces with some JavaScript code was used for client-
side interaction.  JavaServer Faces is a technology that simplifies building user interfaces 
for Java server applications by providing reusable components, simplified page 
navigation, and a drag and drop graphical user interface designer. 
Another benefit of JavaServer Faces is that at runtime, all JavaServer Faces components 
get decompiled into standard HTML tags on the user’s browser.  This approach increases 
the accessibility of TEAMS versus an approach that would have used an embedded 
component such as a Java Applet or a Flash Application.
The data services software module was written as a J2EE application with an Oracle 
database providing the data storage.  Rather than coding specifically for Oracle and 
using Oracle SQL queries for data storage and retrieval, the object/relational persistence 
engine known as Hibernate 5 was used.  Hibernate provides the ability to change the 
database without having to change any of the TEAMS query code.  A simple modification 
to a configuration file allows TEAMS to use another database such as Microsoft SQL 
Server or MySQL if needed. 
The data services software module is used by TEAMS to store data when a message is 
received and to retrieve data when it is requested.  Data is received by the data services 
module through the UCI interface.  When the data is received, the 1512 XML data 
message is validated for conformance to the 1512 schema and then the data is parsed 
from each XML field.  
One important security decision that was made was to do message validation at the 
application level rather than the Web Service Definition Language (WSDL) level.  Had 
validation been done at the WSDL level, it would have exposed the schema in the WSDL 
file.  Assuming that an intruder would be able to correctly guess a username and 
password that would allow access to the WSDL, that intruder would be able to inject 
false data into the system because the schema would be available in the WSDL.  By 
doing the data validation at the application level, access to the schema could be 
restricted to only those that received the UCI documentation, adding an extra layer of 
security that prevents the injection of incorrect data.  
After the data has been parsed from the XML message, some geospatial analysis occurs 
before all of the data is saved to the database.  This geospatial analysis includes reverse 
geo-coding, PSAP boundary lookup, and geo-fence violation detection.  Once the 
geospatial analysis takes place, the data is saved to the database.  The data services 
software also provides a web service interface that is used to populate the TEAMS 
graphical user interface with data.
1.9 The TEAMS user interface is composed of multiple web pages that can 
be navigated to view event data, user account data, and geo-fence 
data.
The TEAMS user interface is composed of multiple web pages that are connected to each 
other and can be navigated through to view event data, user account data, and geo-
fence data.  Figure 1.8 provides a high level overview of the interaction between the 
various pages that form the TEAMS applications.  
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Figure 1.8  The TEAMS user interface connects multiple webpages.
1.9.1 List view displays high level information for all active shipments.
Once authenticated to TEAMS, the user will arrive at the List View page.  As illustrated in 
Figure 1.9, this page contains a list of all active events currently being tracked by the 
TEAMS software.  For each event in the list there is a designation of whether or not the 
event has been declared a transportation security incident (TSI). Additionally, the 
event’s risk level, the event ID, the date and time the most recent update was received, 
the type of event, the status of the event, address, city, state, and estimated population 
impact are shown in the list.  
The event ID displayed in the list is a hyperlink and by clicking on this link a user will 
navigate to the Event Details page for that event.  Also displayed on the List View page 
are tabs that a user can click on to navigate to the Map View page, Action Log page, or 
Emulator page.  A user can filter the list of events being shown by clicking on the ‘Set 
Filters’ button to navigate to the Event Filters page.  A user can change the time zone in 
which times are displayed throughout TEAMS by selecting a time zone from the drop 
down on the List View.  If event data is received by the UCI that triggers an alert, the 
“New Event Alert – Refresh TSI List” button will begin flashing indicating that the user 
needs to update the event list.  This new alert button is displayed on all pages in the 
main TEAMS application.  
1.9.2 The map view page displays the map location of active shipments.
The Map View page illustrated in Figure 1.10 is similar in functionality to the List View 
page in that gives a high level overview of all of the active shipments currently being 
tracked by TEAMS.  It differs from the List View in that all of the shipments are
The TEAMS user interface is 
composed of multiple web pages 
that are connected to each other 
and can be navigated through to 
view event data, user account 
data, and geo-fence data.  
The map view shows all active 
shipments being tracked on a 
map.
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Figure 1.9 Teams list view page
displayed on a map of the United States instead of in a list format.  To obtain overview 
information about an event a user can hover over the event’s icon on the map to be 
shown a popup containing the event ID, address, type, and status.  The Map View page
provides navigational map tools as well as a tool that allows a user to click on an event’s
icon to navigate to the Event Details page to get further event information.  The Map 
View also contains controls that allow a TEAMS user to turn particular map overlays on 
and off as desired.  Also displayed on the Map View page are tabs that a user can click 
on to navigate to the List View page, Action Log page, or Emulator page. 
Figure 1.10 TEAMS map view page.
The list view provides tabulated 
information on all active 
shipments that the system is 
tracking.
The action log page provides 
information on the things that 
“have been done” in tracking 
active shipments.
14
1.9.3 The action log view page displays log entry data for active shipments.
The Action Log View page illustrated in Figure 1.11 shows all of the action log entries 
for each active shipment currently in TEAMS.  Each time the TEAMS database is 
updated, an entry is automatically made in the Action Log. A TEAMS user can also 
manually make an entry in the action log to record anything not entered automatically 
Figure 1.11 TEAMS action log view page.
into the TEAMS data base such as a telephone call. The Action Log View lists the ID of 
the event, the TEAMS username of the creator of the entry, the date and time entered, 
and the text of the action entry.  The event ID displayed in the list is a hyperlink and by 
clicking on this link a user will navigate to the Event Details page for that event.  Also 
displayed on the Action Log View page are tabs that a user can click on to navigate to 
the List View page, Map View page, or Emulator page.
1.9.4 The action log details page provides detailed information for actions related 
to individual shipments.
The TEAMS Action Log Details page illustrated in Figure 1.12 shows all of the Action 
Log data for only the event whose details are currently being viewed.  This page 
contains a table that shows all of the Action Log entries for this event.  Each entry in the 
table includes the name of the person or system that created the entry, the date and 
time of the entry, and the actual Action Log entry text.
Figure 1.12 TEAMS action log details page
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1.9.5 Information on active shipments can be sorted and 
viewed using the event filters page.
The Event Filters page illustrated in Figure 1.13 allows a TEAMS user to filter the 
events that are currently being displayed by TEAMS.  The Event Filters page contains a 
radio button control allowing a user to choose whether to display live events or test 
events, a checkbox control that filters the display to show either open events, closed 
events, or both, and a checkbox control that filters based on the Packing Group of 
chemicals.  Also included are multiple selection lists that allow the user to filter on Event 
Types, Materials, and Carriers.  When the filters are modified, the List View, Map View, 
and Action Log View pages all reflect the filter options.  From the Event Filters page, the 
user can also navigate to the Map View page, Action Log View page, or Emulator page 
using the tabs at the top of the page.
Figure 1.13  TEAMS event filters page.
1.9.6 The event details page provides detailed information on individual 
shipments.
The Event Details page illustrated in Figure 1.14 contains detailed information about a 
specific event in the TEAMS system.  The Event Details page can be navigated to from 
either the List View page, the Map View page, or the Action Log View page.  The Event 
Details page contains a map displaying the location of the vehicle, map navigation tools, 
and map overlay controls that allow a user turn map layers on and off as desired.  The 
Event Details page provides the ability for users with the proper permissions to declare 
the event a Transportation Security Incident (TSI) if instructed by TSA.  Summary 
Information on the Event Details page includes the TEAMS ID of the event, the sending 
source’s ID of the event, the event type and status, the address, the destination, the 
material being carried, the estimated population impact, the latitude/longitude location, 
the creator of the event, the time the event was created, the time of the event’s most 
recent update, and who last updated the event.  The event type and status can be 
updated by the TEAMS user in this section of the Event Details page.  The Vehicle 
Information section displays the make and color of the vehicle, the shipper’s name, the 
carrier’s name, the USDOT registration number, and the commercial registration 
number.  The Geo-fence Data Details section shows the names of the geo-fences being 
violated by this event and it also provides the ability for a TEAMS user to create a geo-
fence that will ‘track’ the event being displayed.   
The events detail page allows 
users to prioritize the list view to 
display high priority events or 
events with a high risk rating.
The events details page provides 
detailed information on individual 
shipments.
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Figure 1.14 TEAMS events details page.
1.9.7 The Google map superimposes vehicle location/data  on Google 
maps.
The Google Map page illustrated in Figure 1.15 is available by clicking on the ‘Show 
Google Map’ button in the map control section of the Event Details page.  Clicking this 
button will open a secondary window that shows the truck’s location along with overview 
data on a Google map (Figure 12).  This page includes map controls to zoom in, zoom 
out, and pan as well as the ability to turn on orthographic map imagery. 
Figure 1.15 TEAMS Google map page
The Google map page allows 
users to superimpose shipment 
data on a Google map and to use 
Google map controls.
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1.9.8 The cargo details page provided information on the type and 
quantity of materials on a carrier’s vehicle.
The Cargo Details page illustrated in Figure 1.16 displays information about the 
materials being transported during a shipment.  Specific information about the material
includes the proper shipping name of the material, the cargo unit ID, the package ID, 
the packing group, amount being transported, the hazard class and division, the 
material’s United Nations (UN) number, and an emergency contact telephone number.  
The Cargo Details page also displays a list of numbers that can be called in no 
emergency contact telephone number is provided.  These numbers include CHEMTRAC, 
CHEM-TEL, INFOTRAC, 3E Company, National Response Center, National Poison Control 
Center, Military Shipments Explosives/Ammunition, and a general number if none of the 
other numbers are appropriate.   
2004 Emergency Response Guide data related to the material is also available on the 
Cargo Details page.  This includes Isolation Zone distance data and the actual guide 
page data from the Emergency Response Guide.  The guide page data is broken up into 
three sections: Potential Hazards, Public Safety, and Emergency Response.  A TEAMS 
user may also enter an entry into the Action Log using a textbox on the Cargo Details 
page.
Figure 1.16 TEAMS cargo details page.
1.9.9 The PSAP/points of interest page displays vehicles and points of 
interest on a map.
TEAMS was designed with the idea that a Public Sector Answering Point (PSAP) would be 
the government action agency that would manage the response to hazmat incidents. For 
the HTSP, the HTSP contractor used a medical dispatch center in the Buffalo 
metropolitan area as the monitoring point for HTSP systems.  The assumption during the 
pilot program is that local PSAPs, like the medical dispatch center, would be the 
government action agency that would coordinate on-scene response activities when a 
hazmat incident occurred.
The Cargo Details page displays 
information about the materials 
being transported during a 
shipment.  
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The PSAP/Points of Interest Details View illustrated in Figure 1.17 displays information 
about the PSAPs and Points of Interest that are within the proximity of the shipment’s 
location.  Contact information for the PSAP whose region this shipment is currently 
located within is always displayed in the first table on this page.  TEAMS users can also 
search for PSAPs near the shipment by entering a search radius in a textbox on the 
page.  The search results will populate a table that will display the contact information 
for all of the PSAPs contained within the entered radius.  These search results include 
the name of the PSAP, its phone number, fax number, email address, distance to the 
PSAP, and its direction in relation to the location of the shipment.  Each entry in the 
table includes buttons to add entries to the Action Log either indicating that a phone call 
was placed to the PSAP or an email sent to the PSAP along with a button that will send a 
fax of summary information to the PSAP.  After the table is a textbox that a TEAMS user 
can use to send a summary information fax to a PSAP whose number may not be listed.
Figure 1.17 TEAMS points of interest page.
This page is also used to display any Points of Interest that are near the shipment’s 
current location.  A TEAMS user can search for Points of Interest near the shipment by 
entering a search radius in another textbox on the page.  After entering the search 
radius, the TEAMS user then selects which map overlays to search from a multiple 
selection list that shows the names of all of the searchable layers.  Once the user has 
selected the desired layers to search, a button must be clicked to conduct the search.  
The search results are displayed in a table that lists the name of the Point of Interest, 
the name of the layer containing the Point of Interest, its distance from the shipment, 
and its direction in relative to the shipment’s location.  A TEAMS user may also enter an 
entry into the Action Log using a textbox on the PSAP/Points of Interest Details page.
1.9.10 The user management page lets system administrators assign and 
manage user rights.
The initial page of the User Management module illustrated in Figure 1.18 is the 
Overview page.  This page contains an ‘Edit Profile’ button for all logged in users.  This 
button will allow the user to navigate to a page that will allow the user to update profile 
The HTSP uses local city/county 
agencies (PSAPs) as the contact 
points for hazmat incidents.  The 
nearest PSAP is identified on the 
map when there is an incident.
The user rights page displays 
user rights that have been 
assigned to individuals by system 
administrators.
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information.  If the user has the appropriate privileges, the ‘Create User’ and ‘Create 
Group’ buttons will be shown which will allow for navigation to the respective pages.  
Also, two tables will be displayed that show all of the users and groups that the logged 
in user can administer.  The user table contains the username of each user, its group 
affiliation, an edit button, and a delete button.  The group table contains the name of 
each group, its parent group, an edit button, a delete button, and various properties 
that are used to restrict the group’s permissions within the TEAMS application.  The 
properties displayed for each group are Create Users, Create Groups, View Classified 
Map Data, Alert PSAP, Acknowledge TSI, Declare TSI, Emulator Access, External System 
Identifier, and Geo-fence Restricted Access.
Figure 1.18 TEAMS user management page.
1.10 TEAMS allows users to build and manage geo-fences.
Initially the geo-fence solution in the HTSP prototype only allowed a user to create a 
geo-fence around an existing transportation event in the TEAMS.  This geo-fence’s 
location would update whenever there was a position update to the event that the geo-
fence was created around.  Whenever another transportation event entered the 
boundary of the geo-fence, the event’s type would be changed to ‘entered geo-fence’ 
and the TEAMS operators would be alerted that an event had entered a geo-fence. 
As more trucks were added to the TEAMS system, the need for a more full featured geo-
fencing capability emerged and the geo-fencing feature was re-designed.  This new 
design allowed TEAMS operators to create geo-fences in multiple ways using a set of 
Geo-fence Designer web pages.  Users could create free-form geo-fences by drawing 
shapes on a map, they could upload an existing ESRI shape-file from their hard drive, or 
they could select geographic features from the existing ESRI shape-files.  
Also included in the geo-fence redesign was a new method of assigning violation 
distances to geo-fences.  Previously, it was thought that the user would create a geo-
fence region and then add various proximity levels to the geo-fence to determine 
violations.  Consider the following case: a user would create a geo-fence around the 
Pentagon and then assign multiple buffer distances to the shape.  Trucks carrying 
phosgene would be required to remain 10 miles away from the Pentagon while trucks 
carrying gasoline would be required to remain 1/2 mile from the Pentagon.  This process 
would have to occur for each chemical.  This becomes a maintenance issue rather 
quickly as multiple geo-fences are created.  The HTPS contractor addressed this problem
by allowing the TEAMS operator to create a single shape for the geo-fence without
New geo-fence authoring tools 
and a new approach to geo-fence 
maintenance were added to the 
prototype by the HTSP 
contractor.
Initially, the HTSP prototype only 
allowed geo-fences to be built 
around an active event.  For 
example, a geo-fence was built 
around a truck and when it got 
within a certain distance of a 
vulnerable object, the system 
registered a geo-fence event.
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creating various distance buffers around the geo-fence.  Instead, these distance buffers 
are determined by each truck on an individual basis.  Each truck carrying a chemical has 
a buffer that is determined by the Emergency Response Guide isolation zone distance 
specified for the chemicals on the truck.  Geo-fence violations occur when this isolation 
zone distance buffer crosses the boundary of a geo-fence created by a TEAMS user. 
An issue that was still remaining with this approach is the overall usefulness of geo-
fencing when position reports are received at long time intervals.  Assuming that most 
trucks will report every hour, it is possible that a truck may pass through a geo-fence 
without a TEAMS operator every being made aware that a geo-fence violation occurred.  
Our approach to lessening the impact of this issue was to add a second buffer distance 
around each truck that takes into account the reporting interval of the truck.  A geo-
fence violation is generated when this second buffer is violated just as it is when the 
smaller buffer distance is violated.  The formula for computing the second buffer 
distance is: isolation zone distance + (reporting interval * speed).  The reporting 
interval variable is determined dynamically by taking the average time between the last
five messages received regarding the truck and speed is assumed to be 60 miles per 
hour. 
Various properties can also be assigned to Geo-fences as they are created.  Geo-fences 
can be assigned a start time and an end time to establish the time period for which they 
are active.  Geofences can also have a list of chemicals assigned to them designating 
that only trucks carrying these specified chemicals will create a geo-fence alert upon a 
boundary violation.  Also, geofences are either classified as exclusionary zones or 
inclusionary zones.  An exclusionary zone creates a violation when an event enters its 
geographic boundary.  Conversely, inclusionary zones generate a violation when an 
event exits the boundary established by the inclusionary zone.  An inclusionary zone 
must have events ‘assigned’ to it and it is only for these events that an inclusionary zone 
will generate an alert upon violation of the boundary.  Inclusionary zones can best be 
thought of as a manner of introducing route adherence to TEAMS.  
The revised approach to creating and managing geo-fences has been successful in 
adding a more full featured set of tools to TEAMS.  Creating a separate set of pages that 
allow for the management of geo-fences is more flexible and useful to the TEAMS 
operators than just allowing users to create a geo-fence at an existing event’s location. 
The amount of geo-fence management time required by the TEAMS users was a concern 
when creating the geo-fence feature.  The approach of using the isolation zone distance 
assigned to the truck rather than assigning various buffer distances to each geo-fence
has removed much of the burden associated with creating geo-fences.  The users of the 
TEAMS geo-fence module only have to define the geographic area of interest and the 
TEAMS software is responsible for determining all of the violations dynamically for each 
truck.  This removes much of the burden from the TEAMS operators. 
The usefulness of the geo-fencing feature is contingent on the reporting intervals of the 
trucks.  By creating a second ring around the truck’s location, we are able to detect 
more geo-fence violations but subsequently, more false alarms are created.  
1.10.1 The HTSP prototype has a number of linked pages for geo-fence 
management.
As illustrated in Figure 1.8, TEAMS has a number of linked pages for geo-fence 
management.  The geo-fence management overview page, illustrated in Figure 1.19, 
has a ‘Create New Geo-fence’ button that will let a user create a new geo-fence.  This 
page also contains a list of the names of all geo-fences that have been created.  For 
each geo-fence listed there are buttons to view, edit, or delete the geo-fence.  Clicking 
on the ‘View’ button next to a geo-fence’s name will load the geo-fence’s details on the 
overview page.  The map portion of the page will update to show the location of the geo-
fence as well as the locations of all of the events that are violating the geo-fence’s 
geographic boundary.  The map portion contains controls that allow the user to zoom in, 
zoom out, pan, and navigate to an address entered by the user.  
Other geo-fence details are displayed in a table in the lower left hand portion of this 
page.  These details include the geo-fence’s name, whether or not it is currently active, 
start time, end time, threat level, whether or not it has restricted access, if it is an
inclusionary zone, and its associated materials.  Also included in this table is an 
The HTSP prototype has a 
number of linked pages for geo-
fence management.
Geo-fences can be programmed 
with different properties.  They 
may be exclusionary (a violation 
when a truck enters the geo-
zone) or inclusionary (a violation 
when a truck leaves the geo-
zone).
The effectiveness of the geo-
fence approach developed by the 
HTSP contractor is a function of 
vehicle location reporting 
frequency.  If the frequency is 
too low, the geo-fencing 
approach will not work well.
The geo-fence approach used in 
the HTSP pilot will create false 
alarms – possibly an 
overwhelming number of false 
alarms for the truck tracking 
center.
The geo-fence general 
information page allows users to 
enter baseline data on geo-
fences they want the system to 
monitor.
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Figure 1.19  TEAMS geo-fence management overview page.
‘accordion’ style component that lists the details of the events that have violated the 
geo-fence.  Each pane in the ‘accordion’ component has the title bar set to the event’s
TEAMS ID and the text in each pane lists the address, event type, material, and 
population impact of the event.  Clicking on an ‘Edit’ button will take the user to the Edit 
Geo-fence page for that geo-fence.
1.10.2 The general information page lets users enter basic data about 
geo-fences they create.
The Geo-fence General Information page, illustrated in Figure 1.20. lets a user enter 
general details about a geo-fence that is being created.  The user must enter a unique 
name for the geo-fence in the text field on the page.  An optional start time and/or end 
time may be entered using calendar controls on the page as well.  Radio button groups 
are provided to enter the geo-fence’s threat level, restricted status, and type.  There are
also fields that will allow users to specify events to associate with the geo-fence, assign
materials to the geo-fence, and choose the method for creating the geo-fence.  If 
associated events are to be specified, the user will enter this information on the Geo-
fence Associated Event page.  Presently, the only supported option for creating the geo-
fence is ‘Free-form Map Drawing’ but in the future map overlay points of interest 
selection and shape file uploading will provide additional options for geo-fence creation.  
There is also a dynamic help box on the page that the user can use to get help about 
specific geo-fence properties that may not be straight-forward.  The user can click on
any of the question mark icons next to a property label to change the information shown 
in the help box.  
1.10.3 The geo-fence associated event page lets users associate events 
with geo-fences.
The Geo-fence Associated Event page, illustrated in Figure 1.21, contains a list that 
allows the user to select an event or events to associate with an event in the TEAMS 
The associate event page 
lets users link a geo-fence 
with individual shipments.
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Figure 1.20  TEAMS geo-fence general information page
Figure 1.21 Geo-fence associated event page
system.  Exclusionary zones can only have one event associated with them while 
Inclusionary zones must have at least one or more events associated with them.  If an
event is associated with an Exclusionary zone, there is no need to draw the geo-fence on 
a map since the geo-fence’s location is the same as the location of the event.  The event
23
list contains the ID, address, carrier, material, and event type information for each non-
test event active in TEAMS.  The address is a link component that when clicked opens a 
popup window displaying a Google map of the event’s location.  If the geo-fence is an 
Exclusionary zone, each entry in the table contains a radio button allowing for the 
selection of one event only.  If the geo-fence is an Inclusionary zone, each row in the 
table contains a checkbox component which will allow the user to select more than one 
event to associate with the geo-fence.  Clicking on the ‘Next Step’ button on this page 
will create the geo-fence if it is an Exclusionary zone or navigate to the Geo-fence 
Creation Wizard Drawing page if it is an Inclusionary zone.
1.10.4 The geo-fence creation wizard drawing page lets users create the 
geographic boundary of a geo-fence.
The Geo-fence Creation Wizard Drawing page, illustrated in Figure 1.22, provides the 
functionality for a user to create the geographic boundary of the geo-fence.  
This page includes a column displaying the information about the geo-fence that the 
user has previously entered in the creation process.  This information includes the geo-
fence’s name, start time, end time, threat level, restriction status, associated events, 
and associated material list.  
There is also an area that dynamically displays the latitude and longitude location of 
points as they are added to the geo-fence.  The ‘Back’ button allows the user to return 
to a previous page to edit any of the information they have previously entered.  
This page also has a map component on which the user will draw the geo-fence.  The 
map component contains standard navigation tools such as zoom in, zoom out, zoom to 
an address, and pan but it also contains three tools allowing a user to draw the geo-
fence on the map.  These tools are draw point, draw line, and draw polygon for each of 
the three types of geo-fence shapes that may be created.  Once the user has used one 
of these map tools to draw the geo-fence, the ‘Save’ button can be clicked to store the 
geo-fence and compute any violations with existing events.
Figure 1.22 TEAMS geo-fence creation wizard drawing page
A geo-fence drawing tool allows 
users to create the geographic 
boundary of a geo-fence.
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1.11 A risk (business rules) engine was successfully demonstrated in the 
HTSP. 5
The HTSP contractor was given the following direction from TSA.
“Assess the feasibility and benefits of a risk-based approach to filtering hazmat 
events and alerts on a prioritized basis in order to minimize false alarms and 
facilitate more timely identification of security threats.”
To address this directive, the contractor analyzed the feasibility of using the UCI and risk 
assessment analytic capability of the FDfolio™ software suite to supplement TEAMS in 
identifying hazmat security risks and distinguishing hazmat events that warrant 
enhanced monitoring and/or follow-up action from those that do not. 6
The importance of distinguishing between hazmat events that warrant enhanced 
monitoring and / or follow-up action from those that do not is driven by the potentially 
large number of hazmat events that could represent security threats and the grave 
nature of the consequences of a security situation that is not detected.  The goal of this 
task is therefore to explore how to eliminate HAZMAT events that are not security risks 
without labor-intensive scrutiny while not overlooking real security events.  
TEAMS was modified to present the results of risk-based analyses, and the UCI was used 
to connect to FDfolio™.  These modifications included changes to each system to 
support: (1) the needed data sharing; and (2) changes within each system to implement 
the new functionality associated with risk assessment activities.  Modifications to TEAMS 
included changes to the database to handle risk assessment specific data (i.e., risk level, 
risk description, recommendations for risk response, and the FDfolio™ URL to allow 
access to risk assessment details), and updates to displays to present risk-based alerts, 
risk assessment data, and recommendations.  Finally, TEAMS was enhanced to 
implement the IEEE-1512 “WatchFor” message used to share risk assessment related 
information with FDfolio™.   
FDfolio™ was also modified to support the TSA hazardous material truck tracking pilot. 
The primary custom component developed to accommodate data exchange and analysis 
                                                          
5  c is taken from, “Hazmat Truck Security Pilot – Final Report – Objective 4, Risk Assessment Feasibility Analysis”; April 11, 2008; 
General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems.
6 FDfolio™ is a commercial software product offered by FreightDesk.  At its heart is a business rules engine, and this component of 
the FDfolio™ product was used for risk-based shipment profiling the HTSP.  The FDfolio™ product has many powerful features 
which were not used extensively in the pilot program.  A description of the broad set of capabilities of FDfolio™ follows.
The “FDfolio™ Suite,” provides a platform for implementing risk-based solutions for freight transportation security.  Built into the 
suite are several risk assessment tools to support the analysis of risks (i.e., link analysis, data mining, predictive/probabilistic 
modeling, GIS spatial, and other analysis tools).  FDfolio™ risk assessment involves four processing stages; data sourcing, data 
fusion, risk assessment, and risk output processing.  Each of these process stages are summarized below. 
• Data Sourcing – FDfolio™ employs a state-of-the-art multimodal data architecture organized around commercial freight 
transportation data and processes.  The system is designed for efficient, high-volume data capture, validation, integration, and 
management. FDfolio™ enables data integrity and compliance checks on data sources and enables the aggregation of data from 
various and disparate sources. If messages are rejected for either syntax, compliance or data accuracy an error report will be 
generated and will provide the error codes and their reason.   Error reports can be available online or can be incorporated in XML 
document, email or other types of electronic alerts. This information process flexibility enables easy collection of data from 
voluntary and/or private sector resources whose information are critical to enabling rich situational awareness.  
• Data Fusion – FDFusion™ provides a “connect-the-dots” data repository that captures, reorganizes, and maintains a complete 
dataset of transactional, commercial, reference, activity, and status data on individual cargo movements (Rail, Maritime, Air, 
Surface, inter-modal). FDFusion™ is the engine that enables the capture, normalization and synthesis of disparate data to enable 
both a common operating picture and the basis for information analytics. 
• Risk Assessment – FDAnaylzer maintains rule sets in a central/shareable repository, which promotes consistent decision-making. 
FDAnalyzer™ provides a user interface to enable analysts and other approved users to create and manage rules. FDAnalyzer™ 
empowers the users to create their own rules set as opposed to having to rely on technical support to write the rules. Risk scores 
are assigned to each transaction based on several factors that assign weights on both an absolute and relative risk-basis for the 
discovered threats and vulnerabilities, facilitating smoother prioritization of mitigation tasks.   Several additional tools for analyzing 
and visualizing shipment information and HAZMAT related risks are also provided. 
• Risk Based Output Processing – FDAnalyzer™ provides the interface for the user to monitor the outputs generated by the 
activated rules such as alerts on transactions that have triggered user-defined threshold requirements. FDAnalyzer™ presents 
transaction-based score results in a navigable drill-down interface, in which a shipment’s total risk score is supported by a detailed 
risk-scoring matrix which is further supported by individual rule-based results. A reporting capability enables easy presentation of 
FDAnalyzer™ activities and results to other interested stakeholders.  This capability is provided using a secure browser that can be 
accessed via TEAMS.  
The FDfolio™ software suite was 
used in the HSTP as a business 
rules engine to identify security 
risks in hazmat transportation.
The UCI and FDfolio™ were 
connected to feed data from 
hazmat shipments to the 
business (risk) rules engine in 
FDfolio™.
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between the TEAMS system and the FDfolio™ risk analysis module was the UCI Data 
Exchange Interface (UCIDEI).  The UCIDEI is a collection of web services and native folio 
“control agents” that support bidirectional data flow and data mapping.  A custom 
application programming interface (API) used by the FDfolio™ rules is also packaged 
with the UCIDEI.  The API is tailored specifically for the Truck Tracking Pilot rules and 
scenarios.  FDfolio™ was also modified to support the process of obtaining data from 
carriers that do not support the UCI, other than for position reports.  FDfolio™ was 
modified to support the generation of messages for key events including gate-out, gate-
in, alerts, and position reports.  These messages also contain information describing the 
truck and its cargo.  For these carriers, FDfolio™ delivers outgoing UCI messages to 
TEAMS to indicate key hazmat shipment events such as gate-out or gate-in.
1.11.1 The UCI, TEAMS, and FDfolio™ interact to provide dynamic risk-
based hazmat shipment tracking based on “events” as they occur.
Positioning the FDfolio™ product as the business rules engine for the HTSP prototype 
required an adjustment in the way the three main components of the system – the UCI, 
TEAMS, and FDfolio™ - worked together.  The concept of operations also needed 
adjustment.
The HTPS system for risk assessment employs an event-driven architecture.  Triggering 
events can occur at the carrier, truck, or truck tracking center, and are communicated 
directly to both TEAMS and FDfolio™ using the IEEE-1512 based Universal 
Communication Interface (UCI).  
There are four types of triggering events: 
1. Location update – The HAZMAT trucks generate location updates at specified 
intervals and are communicated to the HTSS.  The system does not currently 
generate alerts when an expected update is not received, but this can be added. 
2. Gate-out – When a HAZMAT truck first leaves the terminal with a load it issues a 
“gateout” indicating that the shipment has begun.  In some cases, the first location 
report for a shipment serves as the gate-out message. 
3. Gate-in – When a HAZMAT truck arrives at its destination a gate-in message is 
generated indicating that the shipment is complete.  This is complicated in that 
HAZMAT trucks can have multiple destinations for a shipment and therefore can 
have several gate-ins.
4. Declared emergency – In addition to the routine messages associated with normal 
operations, a manually generated panic button message can be generated. 
Additional messages from the carrier or commercial truck tracking systems are also 
anticipated in the future such as hijacking, unexpected decoupling, missed gate-in, 
unexpected loss of weight or pressure, and etc.  
Each new triggering event generates a new risk assessment.  The risk assessments are 
conducted by TEAMS and FDfolio™ working together.  TEAMS evaluates each truck 
location update to determine if there has been a geo-fence violation.  If a geo-fence 
violation has occurred, TEAMS displays this and forwards a UCI message to FDfolio™ 
indicating the violation so the FDfolio™ can determine a risk level for the situation.   
FDfolio™ receives all event messages from the commercial truck tracking systems as 
well as messages from TEAMS when geo-fence violations occur.  FDfolio™ considers all 
information known about the shipment together with the information conveyed in the 
message to determine a risk level.  Additionally, FDfolio™ considers historical 
information it has for the carrier based on past shipments and consults available TSA 
watch lists.  
The risk level determined by FDfolio™ is sent to TEAMS for display and alerting.  When 
risk level is high or severe TEAMS alerts Truck Tracking Center (TTC) operators and
provides notification to the TTC Watch Officer.  By considering all aspects of the 
shipment, historical data, TSA watch lists, and the current event and situation, the risk 
assessment approach attempts to minimize false alarms while enhancing the ability to 
The risk profile of a hazmat 
shipment is changes as the truck 
moves.  For example, when 
coming closer to more sensitive 
areas, the risk will rise.  Alerts 
and events can also change the 
shipment profile.  Dynamic risk 
profiling will be an important 
feature of the truck tracking 
center.
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identify high risk situations early enough to initiate a timely response.  With this 
approach, TTC operators are able to analyze and reconcile risks more confidently based 
on a priority ranking using data that compliments the triggering event information.   
In addition to the determination and presentation of risk levels, the TEAMS and FDfolio™ 
integration supports TTC operators and Watch Officers in resolving high risk situations.  
Information concerning potential impact areas (e.g., population levels, nearby 
infrastructure ents), critical contact information (e.g., phone numbers for carrier and 
local public safety answering point (PSAP)), and a secure mechanism for allowing PSAPs 
and carriers to access the TEAMS displays.  
TSA is also able to access FDfolio™ via a link from TEAMS. Once within FDfolio™, TSA 
staff may then disable rules based on information from the carrier or truck tracking 
center.  TTC Operators Watch Officers, and / or Managers are able to use TEAMS to 
create a Transportation Security Incident (TSI) when determined to be appropriate. 
Figure 1.23 provides an overview of the risk assessment architecture.  It shows key 
systems, data sources, and the interfaces to the TTC and PSAPs.  
Figure 1.23 The HTSP risk assessment architecture
1.11.2 TEAMS was modified to help truck tracking center operators 
monitor shipments with high risk scores.
The following sequence of TEAMS screen shots in Figure 1.24 illustrates what a TTC 
operator sees when a hazmat shipment is a security risk.
The data interaction within a 
truck tracking system enables 
watch officers to make timely 
decisions with confidence.
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Figure 1.24 TEAMS screenshots – security risks
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1.11.3 Dynamic risk profiling requires a substantial amount of data; much 
of the needed data was not available during the pilot.
The success and effectiveness of a risk-based solution for hazmat shipment tracking 
depends on the adequacy of the data that it uses.  The data will need to be available in a 
timely manner and in a usable form.  It will also need to be reliable.   
Three types of data are needed to support the HTSS risk-based solution: event data, 
reference data, and watch list data.  Each of these is described below. 
 Event data.  Event data is generated by the shipment itself.  It includes data 
describing the shipment (e.g., shipping organization, consignee, carrier, contents, 
etc.), data defining events associated with the shipment (e.g., panic button, missed 
gate-in, etc.) and the updates to the location of the truck. 
 Reference data.  Reference data is used to associate a shipment with levels of risk.  
It includes data associated with the material being shipped (e.g., toxicity, 
explosiveness, etc.), relevant historical information (e.g., past performance of 
carrier, driver experience, carrier and truck route histories, etc.), and infrastructure 
information (e.g., location of vulnerable infrastructure). 
 Watch list data.  Watch list data is maintained by TSA.  It identifies carriers, drivers, 
shippers, and consignees that have high risk profiles (i.e., are known or suspected 
to be associated with terrorist organizations or have terrorist intentions based on 
intelligence and / or historical information). 
Not all of these data are currently available.  As more information is made available the 
ability to define rules for estimating risk levels will improve.  At a minimum, it is 
necessary to provide basic shipment data (i.e., carrier identification, event type).   
Shipment contents data is also recommended and can currently be assessed using 
existing rules in FDfolio™.  With this basic data, TEAMS and FDfolio™ can make basic 
Dynamic risk profiling is 
important, but the HTSP pilot 
could only confirm that it is 
possible to achieve it.  Lack of 
data and development of 
workable business rules 
constrained what was possible. 
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risk assessments.  As more data becomes available, more accurate and valid risk 
assessments will be possible.   
Historical data and rules for evaluating shipments against historical norms can be 
developed over time and managed by FDfolio™.  For example, normal routes and 
movement behaviors by truck and carrier can be collected and stored by the system in 
confidence, and rules that compare current shipments to these historical data can be 
developed.  With these data and rules, FDfolio™ can compare current shipment 
information (e.g., updated truck location) to “normal” behavior for that carrier or truck 
in conjunction with other factors to determine a composite risk level.  Over time, more 
complete historical data can be developed, continually improving the overall risk 
assessment. 
Figure  1.25 summarizes the data categories and indicates the data that was available 
during the HTSP. This table also presents the data that are required by the risk 
assessment process as it is currently implemented.   
Figure 1.25 Data availability during the HTSP program.
Event Data
Shipment Data
Planned route No Not available – no electronic routes from 
carriers
Vehicle ID Yes
Origin-destination - Only one carrier provided origin-destination 
information
Shipper - Only one carrier provided shipper information
Carriers Yes
Consignee - Most carriers refused to provide information
Driver No No - but simulated in test
Cargo (material) - Inconsistent
Cargo (quantity) - Inconsistent
Event Type
(real time)
Truck sensor data No
Shipment off course   
No
Overdue shipment   
No
Geo-fence violation  Yes Determined by TEAMS 
Missed gate-in   
No
Vehicle Vehicle data (e.g., VIN, year, 
make, model, registration 
numbers, plate) 
Yes Database, accessed based on Vehicle ID
Carrier
Company name and ID Yes Database, accessed based on Vehicle ID
Contact name Yes Database, accessed based on Vehicle ID
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Watch List Data
Watch List Type
Driver No
Carrier No
Shipper No
Consignee No
Reference Data
Material Class and division (e.g., toxic by 
inhalation, explosive, etc.)
Yes Available from Emergency Response Guide 
(ERG), material data sheets (MDS), etc.  
Isolation zone
Yes
Shipper, 
Consignee
Historical profiles - material 
(e.g., materials, quantities, 
carriers, consignees, etc.) 
No
Can be developed by FDfolio™ over time.  Not 
currently included in pilot system. 
Carrier Historical profiles - material 
(e.g., materials, quantities, 
carriers, consignees, routes, 
etc.)  
No
Can be developed by FDfolio™ over time.  Not 
currently included in pilot system. 
Historical profiles - routes (e.g., 
planned vs. actual routes, fixed 
vs. ad hoc, schedules.  
No Can be developed by FDfolio™ over time.  Not 
currently included in pilot system. 
Driver Background (e.g., experience, 
citizenship, demographics, 
criminal history) 
No Can be developed by FDfolio™ over time.  Not 
currently included in pilot system. 
Hazmat Industry Shipments patterns, statistics 
No
Can be developed by FDfolio™ over time.  Not 
currently included in pilot system. 
Critical 
Infrastructure
Population impact No
Calculated by TEAMS and made available to 
HTSS users but not communicated to FDfolio™.  
This was simulated during a walkthrough 
demonstration. 
Infrastructure impact No
Nearby infrastructure provided by TEAMS 
and made available to HTSS users but not 
communicated to FDfolio™.   
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1.11.4 The rules engine in FDfolio™ was populated with a set of simple 
rules; future rules will provide deeper risk insight.
The HTSP operational deployment implemented a small set of rules in order to 
demonstrate and test the risk-based concept.  Figure 1.26 lists rules that were applied 
during the HTSP program.  
Figure 1.26 Future business rules for hazmat shipments
Rule When Applied FDfolio™ Action
Shipment-score-
baseline-commodity-
shipment
Shipment Initiation FDfolio™ assigns risk score based on commodity
Each commodity consequence factor is managed independently. Default 
commodity score is 100. Score can be changed via the UI.
Shipment-unknown-
driver
Shipment Initiation Checks if the Driver is on the known driver list  - gives score of 200 if 
not.  
Position report Each UCI Event No risk score change, positional data stored in database
Driver alarm Each UCI Event Increments score by 400 if driver alert UCI event is received
Vehicle hijack Each UCI Event Increments score by 500 if hijack UCI event is received.
Entered geo-fence Each UCI Event Increments score by 50 if exclusionary zone entry UCI event is received.
Exited geo-fence Each UCI Event Decrements score by 50 if exclusionary zone is exited UCI is received.
These rules are only an initial sample of those that may eventually be applied.  Much 
greater risk management functionality can be built into a hazmat truck tracking systems 
with a more extensive set of rules.  Future rules will likely fall into one of the following 
categories.
 Cargo Analysis.  Rules in this category consider the nature of the cargo being 
shipped and assess risk inherent in this cargo (i.e., a risk score is assigned for each 
material, additional rules can be added that are associated with a category of 
materials)
 Modal Analysis.  Rules in this category assess risk associated with the shipment 
mode, perhaps in combination with a particular chemical.  For example, in the 
HAZMAT truck situation compared to rail, a higher risk score could be assigned
because trucks can be driven to specific targets or because they are more 
susceptible to a particular type of attack that may be expected based on available 
intelligence.
 Entity Analysis.  Rules in this category consider entities associated with a 
shipment.  For example, a particular consignee may be a source of concern based 
on suspected association with terrorist groups.
 Event Analysis.  Rules in this category are associated with events.  For example, a 
driver alert or geo-fence violation is assigned pre-specified risk scores. This rule 
category can look at larger picture issues such as patterns of events across a region 
or a “swarming scenario” in which multiple shipments are brought together perhaps 
as part of a coordinated attack.
 Historical Analysis.  This rule category considers the behavior of shipments 
compared to historical behavior.  For example, when a HAZMAT truck takes an 
unusual route, follows an unusual schedule, or is carrying an unusual quantity or 
mix of materials.
 Consequence Analysis.  Rules in this category consider the potential 
consequences associated with a particular cargo relative to its current location.  For
example, a rule can be defined that might define a high risk score because the 
There are many types of 
business rules that might be 
developed for hazmat shipments.
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chemical can be used as a weapon against population centers and the truck is traveling 
through high population density areas.
1.11.5 Integration of a risk (business rules) engine into a tracking system 
is feasible and will provide dynamic risk profiling of hazmat 
shipments.
The HTSP experience proved that it is feasible to connect the standards-based UCI to a 
risk-based filtering engine such as FDfolio™ to support near real-time risk assessments 
of hazmat shipments.  
During the project, carrier events such as gate-out, position updates, and panic button 
alerts were forwarded to FDfolio™ by the UCI and successfully processed to evaluate risk
level using a small sample of rules. Qualitative risk evaluation scores were returned to 
TEAMS for display in near real-time.  This ability of the UCI to support the required risk-
based messaging was demonstrated using the operationally deployed HTSS pilot system.  
The risk-based concept, as demonstrated, was analytically shown to reduce false alarms 
and missed signals over the TEAMS-only approach. This conclusion was reached based 
on a walkthrough demonstration and a comparative analysis of the ability of TEAMS with 
and without risk-based support to detect categories of potential threat indicators.  The 
demonstration was based on an actual hazmat shipment that was modified to simulate 
an evolving security threat situation.  Watch list and historical data were simulated to 
support the scenario.  
The analytic comparison of TEAMS with and without risk-based support highlighted 
several potential advantages of the risk-based approach.  These advantages are derived 
from 1). identification of risk factors not available from a TEAMS-only solution; 2).
better ability to consider patterns across multiple shipments; 3). reduced workload with 
the risk-based approach; and 4). more confident decision-making.  More work is needed 
to develop and validate a more comprehensive rule set before these potential 
advantages can be realized, however. 
The FDfolio™ rules engine was effective in conducting near real-time risk assessments 
using a small set of rules implemented during the tests.  A test version of the HTSS was 
employed to test FDfolio’s™ ability to process input event messages, evaluate risk 
levels, and support operational tasks associated with the risk-based approach.  In 
addition to verifying the ability of the TEAMS – FDfolio™ integration to provide risk 
evaluations associated with HAZMAT truck shipment events, these tests evaluated the 
ability to “drill down” into FDfolio™ to access risk assessment details and rationale.  It 
was possible to accomplish the “drill down” to view specific rule firings and when 
necessary disable rules “on-the-fly”.  This capability is intended to support a threat 
validation process.  For example, if non-threatening reasons are found to explain 
parameters interpreted as threatening the rules involved can be disabled.  The tests also 
verified that risk scores returned to TEAMS from FDfolio™ were consistent with rules 
that were implemented.  It was also possible to integrate new rules into FDfolio™ as 
experience and evolving threat environments require. 
While the feasibility and potential advantages of the risk-based approach were 
demonstrated, the actual rules implemented were very limited in scope.  A more 
complete set of rules with improved data sources will need to be developed and 
validated before all the potential advantages can be realized.   
These conclusions were specific to the hazmat truck security problem.  However, it is 
notable that a rules-based approach to evaluating risks has been applied to other 
domains.  For example, FDfolio™ has been applied to rail and air hazmat risk 
assessment domains that involved assessing risks based on hazmat materials and 
intelligence watch lists.  
1.11.6 Valuable risk management lessons were learned during the HTSP 
project.
The following risk management lessons from the HTSP project were presented in the 
final report.
1. Knowledge of expected behavior is an important consideration. It is important to have a 
baseline of expected behavior against which to evaluate hazmat truck actions and assess 
The HTSP project team proved 
that integrating a risk (business) 
rules engine into a truck tracking 
system is feasible and will meet 
TSA’s objectives.
Valuable risk manager rules were 
learned in the HTSP program.
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associated risk levels.  These can be based on normal practice, historical norms for the industry 
or the specific carrier, pre-planned routes, or regulations (e.g., regulations about travel within 
high population areas). 
2. Variable update rate for truck location reporting can provide necessary resolution 
when needed. As hazmat trucks approach locations that are vulnerable to the particular 
hazmat being transported it will be necessary to increase the truck location update rate to 
provide adequate resolution.  By increasing the truck location reporting rate only when needed, 
the costs associated with location reporting can be minimized at other times. 
3. Hazmat-specific risks are an important element of effective risk assessment. Different 
hazmat loads are associated with different risks.  The risk assessment approach therefore 
considers the specific hazmat material being transported.  For example, high population areas 
are vulnerable to compressed gases and toxic materials (hazmat material classifications 2 and 
6, respectively) while critical infrastructure is vulnerable to explosives, flammable liquids, and 
flammables (hazmat material classifications 1, 3, and 4, respectively).  Behaviors and risks are 
evaluated based on the hazmat material being transported. 
4. Knowledge of truck contents is essential.  In order to properly assess hazmat risks (as 
noted above) it is essential that information about what the truck is carrying be made available.  
The quantity of the material being carried is also important. 
5. Access to watch lists provide a valuable intelligence-based perspective .  Watch lists 
offer a potentially valuable adjunct to the risk assessment approach because they allow 
consideration of intelligence information external to the shipment itself.  The ability to take 
advantage of watch lists, however, requires availability of the associated information from 
carriers (e.g., to use a driver watch list it is necessary to obtain driver information from the 
carrier). 
6. Things happen fast near targets.  This is a major advantage of the risk-based approach, i.e., 
that risk-based predictions can provide early warnings.  It is important to structure the risk-
based approach in a way that provides adequate warning when potential risks occur to allow 
time for effective actions to be performed.  Also, this fact requires that decisions and actions be 
taken quickly.  A key objective of the risk-based approach is to provide early warning, 
recommendations, and sufficient information about the risks to allow confident and timely 
decisions.  It is equally, important to minimize false alarms to the extent possible to avoid costly 
and time-consuming responses to non-threats.  This is also an objective to the risk-based 
approach.
1.12 An emulator in the HTSP allowed users to “practice” using the HTSP 
prototype.
The Emulator page, illustrated in Figure 1.27, allows TEAMS users with the appropriate 
user account privileges to create test events in TEAMS.  TEAMS users that do not have 
Emulator access privileges will not see the Emulator navigation tab when using TEAMS.  
The Emulator page contains a map that allows a user to enter an event’s location, 
dropdown boxes to set an event’s type and status, an area to enter cargo information, 
and an area to enter vehicle and driver data.  Once this data is entered, a user can click 
a button to create a single test message with the data that had been entered.  The 
Emulator also contains a section that allows a user to create an event that will update 
automatically by entering a speed, heading, and update rate for the event.  The 
Emulator page also has tabs that a user can click on to navigate to the List View page, 
Map View page, or Action Log View page.
The HTSP contractor had to find alternate ways to get cargo data from carriers.  One 
approach involved the use of FDfolio™ to enter cargo data.  Another approach was to 
assign data to “fill in” missing data using a “data publisher.”  
None of the approaches for capturing cargo data, however, involved the use of an 
electronic manifest.  An electronic manifest would have provided an elegant and 
functional solution to TSA’s needs for hazmat cargo information, especially if the solution 
integrated with the Customs and Border Protection’s ACE Truck E-Manifest.
1.13 The HTSP project report suggested enhancements to the prototype.
In its final reports, the HTSP contractor listed a number of enhancements that it 
expected would be included in an enhanced version of a hazmat truck tracking center.  
 Improve the TEAMS user interface by removing the Refresh List button.  A graphical 
component can still be used to flash to get the user’s attention in the case of a new 
alert message being received but new data could be loaded into the list or the
Truck tracking center operators 
can practice using the HTSP 
prototype using the emulator to 
simulate real events.
The HTSP project team 
suggested numerous 
enhancements to the prototype.
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Figure 1.27  TEAMS emulator page
map without user interaction.  This approach was not originally taken since the List View 
is sorted by time and the development team felt that automatically loading the newest 
event data to the top of the list would cause the rows in the list to continually ‘jump’ 
from the bottom to the top making it difficult for a user to focus on a row if new data 
were being received at a high rate.  One way to prevent this is to instead sort the list 
based on risk level or on the internally generated TEAMS ID.  If the data is sorted by risk 
level, the most serious events will be shown at the top of the list for the user.  
 Improve vehicle tracking.
o Increase minimum vehicle location reporting interval to at least once every fifteen 
minutes, with the capability to increase the frequency if events dictate.
o Establish two-way communications with truck tracking systems to enable 
automated requests for reporting rate adjustments. 
o Enhance geo-fencing capability to allow carrier software systems to upload their 
origin, destination, and current routes. 
 Enhance population impact calculations by considering individual buildings rather 
than simply calculating percentages of census tract data and considering time of 
day.  
 Build the capability to accept information on planned shipments as well as active 
shipments.  Planned shipment information would provide analysts the capability to 
preemptively make decisions on tracking or possibly canceling shipments.
 Update TEAMS alerting logic. Most of TEAMS’ alerting functionality was not 
anticipated originally, and a redesign might help identify ways to make it function 
better. 
 Make the User Management graphical user interface more user-friendly so that it is 
easier for users to determine the hierarchical relationships between groups and 
users.  One way of accomplishing this would be to replace the tables on the main 
User Management page with a tree structure instead.  The currently logged in user’s 
group would be at the top of the tree with all of the subgroups listed underneath.  
This type of structure would more accurately represent the hierarchical nature of
Automatically refresh events on 
the TEAMS user interface – sort 
the list based on risk to avoid 
losing sight of important 
shipments.
Enhance vehicle tracking.
 Increase truck location 
frequency to at least every 15 
minutes.
 Establish 2-way 
communications with fleet 
tracking vendors.
 Allow carriers to upload 
electronic route plans.
Improve population at risk 
calculation features.
Build features to allow shippers 
to store information on future 
shipments.
Redesign TEAMS alerting 
functionality.
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the user accounts in TEAMS.  The graphical user interface can also be further
enhanced by improving the processing time required to load the pages. 
 Tighten integration between TSA and the first responder community by developing 
electronic data exchange integration capabilities with Computer Aided Dispatch 
(CAD) systems.  The first responders will receive incident information more quickly 
than they do now and the TEAMS software can receive more detailed information 
from the first responders when they arrive at the incident scene.  Many 
communities currently have their own CAD systems and data messages can be 
exchanged using the same 1512 format message that the UCI accepts. 
 Integrate voice over IP (VoIP) within the TEAMS application to allow users to make 
voice calls over the internet from the TEAMS software rather than using a traditional 
land-line telephone.  One possible method of integration would be to use the API 
offered by VoIP provider Skype.  This API allows developers to utilize Skype’s 
existing VoIP infrastructure in their own custom applications.  
 Improve material handling information: 
o Update the ERG database when the 2008 version of the ERG is released.  
o The isolation zone information is currently displayed as just a distance measure 
and not contextually related to the event.  The isolation information should be 
graphically displayed using a map that would allow quick identification of any 
points of interest that might be impacted by material.  
o The ability to perform plume modeling should be considered in conjunction with 
the isolation zone information. 
o The material handling guides shown are just those related to the materials 
associated with a given event.  The operator should be provided with a means 
to look up the information for any material, thus allowing for corrections if the 
material reported is incorrect or no material is reported
 Update the map layers used by TEAMS once a year.  Also, new vector map overlays 
that are required by TSA should be added to the TEAMS GIS as needed. The 
orthographic map capabilities can also be enhanced natively within the TEAMS GIS.  
If possible, the Google Maps satellite imagery should be replaced with detailed 
satellite imagery in the TEAMS ArcIMS map service.  Doing so will require detailed 
imagery tiles to be acquired for all of the United States and additional storage space 
to accommodate all of this data.  There may also be potentially significant software 
modifications to optimize the performance of loading the detailed satellite imagery.  
However, in the long run decoupling the TEAMS software from the Google Maps 
service will be beneficial provided that Google may at any time discontinue third 
parties from using their Google Maps API.
 Establish a two way communications interface between the truck tracking software 
packages and the TEAMS software to enable the automated increase of a truck’s 
reporting rate.  As the software works now, the same alert is created whether the 
inner ring or the outer ring surrounding the event violates a geo-fence’s boundary.  
After adding two way communications between the tracking software and TEAMS, a 
geo-fence violation by the outer ring will not generate an alert to the TEAMS 
operator but instead automatically increasing the reporting rate for that truck.  
Then, if the inner ring penetrates a geo-fence’s boundary, a message will be 
generated to alert the TEAMS operator.  This will reduce the number of false alarms 
that are created when the larger outer ring crosses a geo-fence boundary and 
TEAMS operators will only have to manage events whose inner rings have caused a 
geo-fence violation. 
 Allow carrier software systems to upload their current routes to TEAMS to make the 
route adherence feature more feasible operationally.  Although computing route 
deviations is not a technically demanding task, the TEAMS operators may not be 
familiar with the routes that specific trucks are required to adhere to and this is 
where the difficulty lies in truly implementing route adherence.  This task is best 
done at the carrier since the route is often more familiar to the carrier’s staff.  By 
providing the functionality to allow the carrier to upload its routes to TEAMS and 
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assign them to specific shipments, route adherence will become a useful feature of 
TEAMS. 
 Add a feature to the geo-fence creation software that allows a TEAMS user to 
compute a route by assigning a start location and an end location.  This will allow a 
TEAMS user to create a route without having to draw it using the free-form drawing 
tools.  If the carrier’s software does not possess the ability to create and transmit 
routes to TEAMS, the carrier users can use this.
 Enhance the estimated population impact feature by replacing census tract data 
with house data.  Houses will either be within the isolation zone of an event or 
outside of the radius and there will no longer be the need to perform the percentage 
of census tract estimate calculation.  Further enhancements can include factoring 
the local time into population impact calculations.  Another data source will need to 
be provided to TEAMS that will indicate population data in a particular location at 
various times throughout the day.  This data set can provide more accurate results 
since some areas (like urban business districts) grow in population during the day
and shrink in population at night.  Advanced plume model analysis can also be used 
to deliver even more accurate population impact estimates.  This would include 
factoring in weather data to the calculation to determine weather, wind speed, and 
wind direction which will affect how a chemical spreads when released into the 
environment.  In its current implementation the population impact calculation 
assumes that the chemical will spread in a perfect circle around the truck.
 Enhance the emulator to provide a full featured data entry page for use by certain 
TEAMS users.  A full featured data entry page will provide the ability to generate 
live messages that will be sent to the UCI rather than only the test messages sent 
by the emulator.  This enhancement will be useful to participating hazmat carriers 
that can not automatically generate gate out and gate in messages to send to the 
UCI.  These carriers will be able to login to the TEAMS data entry page and enter 
information about their trucks and when they are scheduled to depart for their 
shipments.  When the scheduled shipment time elapses, a gate out message can be 
sent to the UCI and an event will be created in the TEAMS system.  Subsequent 
updates to this event will occur when tracking data is correlated with the event 
using the truck information.  These carriers that use TEAMS for manual data entry 
will also have access to TEAMS so that they can monitor and track their fleet 
through the TEAMS software.  
 Enhance in-house truck tracking center training capability.
o Build a separate system for controlled training to avoid burdening the live and 
test systems.  
o Build a VoiceXML application to replicate TSA and PSAP responses in a training 
exercise.
o Build an analysis tool to evaluate operator performance in handling the 
simulated events.  By analyzing the time statistics for each operator’s reaction 
to the simulated events, it can determine who needs additional training and 
more efficiently allocate our available training resources.
 Provide an external alert (email message, SMS message, etc.) to TSA when an 
event is not acknowledged by the truck tracking center after a certain time 
threshold.  For example, if an event remains unacknowledged for more than one 
minute, an email can be sent to TSA brining their attention to this event.  This will 
add an extra layer of notification to help ensure that an actual transportation event 
does not go undetected by TSA. 
 Build a better cargo data interface.
o Build a cargo data entry application that is explicitly designed for the purpose of 
tracking hazardous materials.  Provide interface information to shippers and 
carriers so that they may use their existing systems to submit cargo data to the 
truck tracking center.
o Discourage the use of FDfolio or similar applications for entering gate-out and 
gate-in events.  The reason for this is that using such an application requires an 
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operator at the carrier facility to reliably enter the events.  A far better solution 
is using the tracking vendor systems to have the driver create the events.
 Increase the performance and message rate of the HTSP prototype.
o Increase the speed of PSAP contact information retrieval.
o Use ArcSDE instead of ArcIMS for PSAP contact queries.  ArcSDE is a Spatial 
Database Engine that allows shapefiles to be stored in a relational database and 
queried against and is designed to perform high performance geospatial 
queries.  
o Display PSAP Details Page Data on a map.  Adding a map to this page showing 
the PSAP boundaries in addition to the textual descriptions of the PSAP contact 
information will be a more complete solution for a TEAMS user.  Also, providing 
the functionality to allow a TEAMS user to make notes about a particular PSAP 
may be a useful feature.  For example, a TEAMS user can make notes about 
whether or not the PSAP has internet access allowing access to TEAMS or who 
they spoke with regarding an event.  This data could then be retrieved by any 
user during future communications with this PSAP. 
o TEAMS should be optimized to improve message throughput and user interface 
performance.  To improve throughput, the database storage and geospatial 
data lookup processes can both be optimized.  Performance tuning the Oracle 
database will increase the speed in which data is written to the database.  By 
implementing a Spatial Database Engine (SDE) rather than performing data 
queries on a map feature layer service will increase the speed in which
geospatial data is queried.
o Improve user interface processing speed by replacing many of the JavaServer 
Faces components with more basic HTML components.
o Improve performance by using partial page refreshes using the Asynchronous 
JavaScript and XML (AJAX) web programming technique.  Instead of requiring 
an entire page refresh when new data is requested, AJAX will allow a partial 
refresh of only the data that needs updating considerably improving load time 
from the user’s perspective.  For instance, when zooming in on the map, only 
the map portion of the page should be refreshed, not the entire page.  Some of 
these concepts are applied throughout the geo-fence designer pages and can 
be applied throughout the entire TEAMS application.
o Tune Java Virtual Machine (JVM) Heap allocations.  The fact that the average 
CPU load was observed to increase and decrease significantly under a constant 
message rate indicates that other processes were occupying the CPU time in a 
less than optimal way.  A likely process is memory allocation and garbage 
collection within the JVM.  The JVM heap sizes can be tuned to reduce these 
peak loads on the CPU and allow for more processing resources for the 
application. 
o Tune the Thread Pools and Connection Pools.  Similar to the JVM heap, thread 
pools and connection pools can be optimized for the application. 
o Tune the Oracle database.  Access by the application to the database is through 
the Hibernate persistence and query service.  This makes measuring the time 
required for this access difficult to measure at the application level.  However 
tuning the Oracle database to the loads may increase performance. 
o Increase number of processors.  After the steps outlined above are addressed, 
more processor will need to be added to increase the number of truck that can 
be tracked by the TTCP.  The first step may be to run the TEAMS Map server 
(ArcIMS) on separate dedicated server.  Currently it shares a server which 
hosts the web pages.  Also the TEAMS web service and the Oracle database 
could be hosted on separate servers.  Beyond that, clustering of the JBoss 
Application servers and the Oracle database need to be evaluated.  
 Use ArcSDE to reduce the computational time needed to retrieve geographic 
information relative to an incident’s current location.  Currently the ArcIMS product 
is used to retrieve this information.  Although ArcIMS provides this feature, the 
main role of ArcIMS is to render map images for display on a user interface not to 
do geo-processing.  The optimal product to use for geospatial information retrieval 
Increase performance and 
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is ArcSDE.  The main function of ArcSDE is to do geo-processing tasks such as 
reverse geo-coding and points of interest lookup.  Using ArcSDE instead of ArcIMS 
to accomplish these tasks will greatly improve the overall performance of TEAMS, 
especially in a large scale deployment environment where multiple data messages 
are arriving each second.
 Provide TEAMS users with a more efficient way to manage multiple events.  
o Option one is to provide a user interface that allows multiple ‘windows’ to be 
open within one web browser window that will be more like a ‘desktop’ that a 
web page.  This option will provide the TEAMS user with a list of all of the 
events just as the current version does.  However, when viewing an event’s 
details the user will not be required to navigate to a new page.  Instead of 
navigating to a separate page, the list will remain visible to the user and a new 
‘window’ will be shown that displays the selected event’s detailed information.  
Multiple ‘windows’ can be opened at once and each can be dragged, resized, 
minimized, or closed.  This will allow the user to view multiple events at any 
one time but the interface may become cluttered and confusing if many event 
details ‘windows’ are open at once. 
o Option two is to provide an expanded List View that displays additional data.  
This option will be a much less radical change than the previous option utilizing 
a ‘desktop’ and ‘windows’.  In this option, the List View will essentially look the 
same in its initial state but there will be an arrow icon at the beginning of each 
row.  The TEAMS user may click on this icon to show more data for the selected 
event without navigating to the full Event Details page.  When the arrow is 
clicked, the row in the table will expand downward and more data will be 
revealed to the user.  This data will include a map of the event’s location (either 
using Google Maps or the TEAMS native ArcIMS service), the first contact 
information, and Emergency Response Guide data, as well as other data that is 
identified as this idea is developed.  A similar functionality can be added to the 
Map View page that will allow for the dynamic loading of event details in a 
portion of the Map View page rather than navigating to the Event Details page.  
All of these user interface updates and the associated data retrieval will be 
developed using AJAX techniques so that no page refreshes will occur and the 
data loading will appear fluid to the user.
o Option three is to create a ‘dashboard’ start page with capabilities expanding 
upon the original List View page.  The overview data would still be shown in a 
list format but an overview map will also be visible on the ‘dashboard’ page.  
This will provide an integrated view for the user showing both the list and the 
map simultaneously.  The list will also have the data expansion feature as 
described above but the map portion will not be displayed in each row.  
Instead, when the TEAMS user expands the list data for the event, that event’s 
icon will be highlighted on the overview map.  This will allow the TEAMS user to 
see how any of the selected events geographically relate to each other on a 
single map.  The ‘dashboard’ will initially show the user events with risk scores 
higher than low risk but filter options will be available natively on the 
‘dashboard’ allowing the user to modify the view as desired without requiring 
an entire page refresh.
 Modify the TEAMS management approach to improve the ability of TEAMS to handle 
multiple events simultaneously.
o Filter out position reports and normal shipments by default so that the TEAMS 
operators are not overwhelmed with information.
o Add the ability for a TEAMS “manager” to assign resolution of a specific incident 
to a specific operator on duty.
o Provide the TEAMS “manager” with a high level overview of all incidents 
currently in progress to monitor the status of their resolution by the operators. 
o Provide the feature allowing a TEAMS operator can take control of an incident if 
it hasn’t been assigned to another operator yet.  This will help reduce any 
potential bottlenecks of requiring a “manager” to be in the loop of any incident 
resolution. 
Enhance TEAMS so that users 
can manage multiple events –
Option 1: multiple windows in 
the web browser.
Enhance TEAMS so that users 
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o Provide a TEAMS feature that will group incidents that are occurring within the 
same geographic region.  One TEAMS operator can then coordinate with one 
PSAP call taker about multiple incidents.
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2.0   Independent Verification & 
The U.S. Transportation Security Administration employed an independent verification 
and validation (IV&V) contractor to evaluate the HTSP technology prototype.
The goal of the IV&V effort was to assess 
program requirements, whether system performance and technical benchmarks were 
met, and if additional requirements needed to be met in an operational truck tracking 
system.
The IV&V process implemented on this p
industry accepted IV&V approaches to analyze and evaluate software and IT applications 
and operational testing programs. For the HTSP Prototype system, the Evaluation Team 
conducted two types of IV&V testing: (1) technical system verification and validation, 
and (2) evaluation of operations of the HTSP Prototype syst
also evaluated stakeholder/user issues with the HTSP.
2.1 The IV&V contractor identified HTSP technology prototype system defects.
In the area of technical system verification, the Evaluation Team identified 23 system 
defects. Figure 2.1 summarizes all the identified defects based on the five defined 
categories and their associated severity levels, based on High, Medium, or Low levels
Severity Level Functionality
Interface
High 1
Medium 3
Low 5
Total
(Percentage)
9
(39%) (30%)
Following are brief descriptions of the most serious of these identified system defects:
 Functional Defects: Based on the testing results, the geo
not reliable. For example, events that are supposed to trigger geo
did not trigger alerts. Events that are linked to a “cleared, 
incorrectly appear as “entered geo
 System Performance: Two factors significantly slowed down system 
performance― slow TEAMS response time and the inadequate speed of the map 
refresh function.
 System Security:  Unlike typical, password
HTSP system does not time out after a certain amount of idle time. Additionally, 
web-based systems do not typically store user identification (ID) and password 
information on the local machine.
                                                          
1 This section is taken from the Executive Summary (May 27, 2008) Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP); U.S. 
Transportation Security Administration, Transportation Sector Network Management, Highway and Motor Carrier 
Programs Office; pages 12-23.  The Executi
Application Kit for TSA FY2009 Trucking Security Program.
http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/grants/
41
Validation Review of the 
HTSP Technology Prototype 1
if the HTSP technology prototype satisfied 
roject by the Evaluation Team was based on 
em.  The Evaluation Team 
.
Figure 2.1.  Summary of Technical IV&V Testing Results
User System 
Performance
System 
Security
Regression
0 2 2 0
1 0 1 0
6 0 1 1
7 2
(9%)
4
(17%)
1
(4%)
-fencing functionality is 
-fence violations 
removed” geo-fences still 
-fence.”
-protected web-based systems, the 
ve Summary was published by TSA as part of its Grant Guidance and 
programs/tsp/2009/guidance_application.shtm
Total
5
5
13
23
(100%)
The U.S. Transportation Security 
Administration employed an 
independent verification and 
validation contractor to evaluate 
the HTSP technology prototype.
The IV&V contractor identified 
three types of defects in the 
HTSP technology prototype:
 Functional defects
 System performance defects
 System security defects
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Despite the above system and operations issues, the HTSP Prototype effort 
demonstrated that the concept for HTSP was feasible and realistic. The testing further 
highlighted the successful implementation of the non-proprietary Universal 
Communications Interface set of protocols that will allow alerts and tracking information 
to be transmitted from all commercially available tracking systems to a prototype truck 
tracking center (TTC) and a 24-hour Government intelligence operations center.
2.2 The IV&V contractor conducted staged events testing to identify HTSP 
operational issues.
The evaluation team conducted 92 staged events during operational testing.  Eight 
motor carriers, with 124 power units, and 4 different tracking vendors participated in the 
operational testing. The Evaluation Team conducted the tests between September and 
December 2007.  Operational testing consisted of 46 panic alert events and 46 geo-
fence violations, either exclusionary or inclusionary. Figure 2.2 below shows a TEAMS 
view of a panic button alert test conducted by the Evaluation Team.
Figure 2.2.  TEAMS Details View Page Showing a Driver Alarm.
As part of the testing approach, staged events were established to assess the timeliness 
and quality of information transfers between the tracked trucks, participating motor 
carriers, and the Rural Metro operators (acting as the TTC watch standers and 
representatives from TSA). 
Three different staged events were used during the testing: (1) panic alert; (2) 
exclusionary geo-fence; and (3) inclusionary geo-fence2.  The events were triggered by 
drivers in the field or dispatchers located in motor carrier facilities through activation of 
a panic button, or by violating an established parameter of a geo-fence. For the staged 
event testing, an exclusionary geo-fence is a defined boundary that a truck must remain 
                                                          
2 Other attack scenarios can certainly be envisioned beyond those tested, including attempts to mask the GPS 
signal and then commandeer a truck, attempts to remove HAZMAT cargo from a trailer or tank, or theft of an 
entire trailer or tank without disruption to the power unit. However, such scenarios were deemed to be outside of 
the scope of the initial pilot deployment and will be addressed in subsequent tasks of this study. 
HTSP staged events were used to
identify operational defects in the 
HTSP technology prototype.
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outside of, whereas an inclusionary geo-fence is one in which the truck must remain within. 
The staged event testing process proved problematic, and significant system problems 
were identified. Figure 2.3 provides an overview of the types of problems and the level 
to which they affected the staged event testing.
Figure 2.3.  Frequency of Problems/Issues Occurring During Staged Event Testing
Problem/Issue
Number 
of Geo-
Fence 
Violation 
Alerts
Number 
of 
Panic 
Alerts
Total 
Combined 
Alerts
Applicable 
Number of 
Staged 
Events 
Percentage 
of Staged 
Events 
Affected
The TTC did not receive or respond to 
alerts.
21 5 26 92 28
TTC was unable to maintain current or 
multiple carrier contact information.
5 8 13 92 14
TTC watch stander was unable to identify
the specific truck generating an alert to the 
carriers.
20 32 52 92 57
Interpretation of carrier macros to open up 
a trip, know what the cargo is, and 
respond to an alert.
19 3 22 92 24
Carriers contacted multiple times for the 
same event as though a new event had 
occurred.
1 2 3 92 3
The TTC was overloaded by multiple 
staged events in short succession.
1 1 2 3 67
The results from the table indicate that two of the problems/issues encountered during 
the staged event testing occurred in more than 50 percent of the applicable staged 
events: (1) the TTC was overloaded by multiple staged events in short succession; and 
(2) the TTC watch stander was unable to identify the specific truck generating an alert to 
the carriers.
The results also indicate that two of the problems/issues occurred in approximately 25 
percent of the applicable staged events: (1) the TTC did not receive or respond to alerts; 
and 2) interpretation of carrier macros to open up a trip, know what the cargo is, and 
respond to an alert.
For the portion of the test operations in TEAMS developed by the Evaluation Team that 
did work successfully in TEAMS, the Evaluation Team focused on measuring the system 
operational performance of the TTC Response Timeline to a potential security incident. 
This timeline is a function of: (1) the time to detect the alert through TEAMS; (2) the 
time to establish communications with the TSA Watch Officer; and the (3) time to 
contact the carrier to verify the nature of the alert. Due to the limited data set, this 
assessment, which included the application of Monte Carlo Simulation, resulted in the 
following key findings:
 Mean elapsed time of 8 minutes to complete the TTC Response Timeline for panic 
button alerts.
 Mean elapsed time of 16 minutes to complete the TTC Response Timeline for geo-
fence violation alerts.
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These findings illustrate that the mean time for both alert types (panic button and geo-
fence) was 12 minutes. Based on feedback from the law enforcement community, the 
time period of up to 12 minutes to confirm an incident and declare a TSI is significantly 
longer than what would be considered effective for interdiction of a truck, especially in 
an urban setting. Therefore, a future architecture and Concept of Operations needs to 
consider that the nearest PSAP or other appropriate incident management lead agency, 
have access to the alert and receive the same TTC information for alerts at the same 
time that the TTC receives it. This approach will increase the likelihood that various first 
responders could respond in a coordinated effort, thereby positioning units to interdict 
as soon as TSA would declare a TSI.
While the above findings and issues point out to the immaturity of the HTSP system, the 
testing effort nevertheless demonstrated that a centralized TTC could accept carrier 
tracking data and respond to panic alerts generated by carriers, as well as alerts 
resulting from carrier violation of TTC-established geo-fence boundaries.
2.3  The IV&V contractor evaluated stakeholder/user acceptance of the
technology prototype.
The Evaluation Team’s approach to assessing stakeholder and user acceptance and 
review of the HTSP system involved active engagement and follow-up with a diverse set 
of public and private sector groups, including the following:
 Public Sector: TSA; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC); Department of Defense (DoD); Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA); Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA); Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA); Commercial Vehicle Safety 
Alliance (CVSA); Military District of Washington, D.C.; and Regional/State Law 
Enforcement (LE) Agencies, Fire Departments, Emergency Management (EM) 
Agencies, State Transportation Agencies, Hazardous Material/Environmental 
Agencies, and Academic Institutions.
 Private Sector: Motor Carriers; Hazardous Materials Manufacturers and Suppliers; 
Vehicle Immobilization Technology (VIT) Vendors; Satellite Tracking Vendors; 
Satellite Communications Providers; Trucking Industry Association; and other 
private companies. 
The Evaluation Team conducted one live and three static demonstrations of the TTC 
concept to collect information and data from potential HTSP users. The demonstrations 
took place in Virginia, California, and Washington. The demonstrations used a scripted 
scenario involving a truck carrying hazardous materials deviating from its assigned 
route, causing an alert, and prompting the involvement of the TTC, TSA, motor carrier, 
emergency dispatch, and first responders. The scenario developed into a transportation 
security incident (TSI), and the TTC facilitated collaboration among the responding 
agencies and provided access to the HTSP system. The scenario came to a successful 
conclusion when law enforcement intercepted and stopped the truck. 
Immediately following each demonstration session, the audience members participated 
in focus group or question and answer sessions to assess and document participants’ 
views on the materials and demonstration. Based on the results of these sessions, the 
Evaluation Team developed a set of focused findings for both the public and private 
sectors across the following four areas:
 Concept of Operation (ConOps) Issues: The current ConOps relies on the TTC 
and its ability to facilitate an appropriate response once an alert is received through 
TEAMS. Several first responders feel TSA should not attempt to assist in managing 
emergency response using the TTC capabilities, but rather through the TTC, provide 
first responders with requested information on the hazmat load and the truck 
carrying it. The first responders also noted that the concept does not appear to 
readily allow information and data to be passed from law enforcement personnel in 
the field to the TTC. A major concern of the first responders is that the concept’s 
protocol, as it is currently designed, results in a process that is too slow, does not 
involve local responders quickly enough, or provide them the information they need 
The IV&V contractor evaluated 
user acceptance of the HTSP 
technology prototype.
ConOps should be changed to 
provide direct support to first 
responders in the field.
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to respond quickly and in a manner safest to the public at large. However, the idea 
of the TTC notifying jurisdictions and maintaining contact with responders as long as 
necessary, and in providing all contacted parties with a call-back number in the 
event more information or assistance is needed also is well received.
 Other Operational Issues: One issue raised with the HTSP notification process in 
that there is no national consistency/standard with the protocol as it is currently 
designed; there would need to be actual mapping of the emergency response 
communications network at a national level. There also is concern that the action 
model does not conform to National Incident Management System (NIMS) or 
National Response Plan (NRP) (now the National Response Framework as of January 
2008); does not use common terminology for incident management; and would not 
allow for all the needed transportation agencies or organizations at the State and 
county level to be involved. Some stakeholders also feel that law enforcement at 
the Federal and State levels should be much more involved in either leading the 
day-to-day management of the HTSP system or being the first to receive the alert 
notifications. Additionally, one of the more prevalent operational concerns from the 
first responders and transportation organizations and agencies involves testing the 
capacity of the HTSP system to handle multiple alerts and/or incidents 
simultaneously, and the number of false alarms that the system receives in an 
alert-rich environment.
 Regulatory Issues:  One of the most significant issues, and one that warrants 
further investigation, is how the HTSP program will integrate with other Federal 
agency programs that regulate hazardous materials. The USDOT, Department of 
Energy (DOE), Department of  Defense (DoD), and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) are all involved in regulating, in some fashion, the security and 
safety of hazardous material manufacture, movement, and disposition. Where the 
HTSP program fits in the scheme of regulatory requirements and how information 
and data will be exchanged to leverage capabilities is a public sector concern. Also 
of concern are information sharing and personnel security. Public Law 110-53, 
‘‘Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,’’ more 
commonly known as the “9/11 Bill,” requires TSA to develop a program to track the 
shipments of certain groups or classes of material in a particular amount or form 
known as “security-sensitive material” (S-SM). The collaborative process for the 
HTSP program ConOps involves many “actors” and the concern focuses on how 
cargo information and data involving S-SM will be protected as it is exchanged.
For private sector motor carriers the key issue appears to be whether or not 
participation in the HTSP program will be compulsory or voluntary when it is 
implemented. Several questions that were raised included that if participation becomes 
compulsory, what is the anticipated number of motor carriers who will be in the 
program, the number of loads that will be impacted, what specific data that will be 
required, and what type of costs were envisioned for the carrier industry associated with 
participation. Liability is also of concern, as well determining who will be responsible 
when damage to equipment or injury to personnel occur as a result of or relating to an 
alert, false alarm, or incident. 
Motor carriers who participated in the HTSP Staged Event testing had mixed feelings 
overall about the usefulness of the HTSP system. Most were very satisfied with their 
current security equipment and technology used in performing operations; however, not 
all were as satisfied that the equipment and technology made all of their shipments 
secure. Regarding the HTSP system process of information dissemination during the 
staged event testing, most of the motor carriers were satisfied; however, others cited 
dissatisfaction with presentation of information, usefulness of information, and 
completeness of information. Regarding the HTSP system procedures for information 
dissemination during staged event testing, there were varying levels of satisfaction for 
the motor carriers; however, others cited dissatisfaction with clarity of information from 
the TTC, completeness of information from the TTC, and consistency of being contacted 
by the TTC.
2.4  IV&V Conclusions and Recommendations
Figure 2.4 summarizes the conclusions and recommendations of the IV&V contractor.  
The purpose of the recommendations as stated by the IV&V contractor was to…
The technology prototype does 
not conform to the National 
Incident Management System.
TSA’s truck tracking center 
should integrate with other 
federal systems that hold hazmat 
data and/or provide some type of 
tracking capability.
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“… provide input concerning the future direction of the HTSP program, including the 
future full deployment of HTSP and TTC technologies in the United States.”
Figure 2.4.  IV&V Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions Corresponding Recommendations
 The HTSP test successfully demonstrated the 
potential of TTC technologies and standards, 
including the use of the Universal 
Communications Interface (UCI).
 The high-level TTC concept, which incorporates UCI 
technologies, should be a cornerstone of the future 
deployment of the HTSP system.
 The HTSP test proved the concept that a 
centralized TTC could accept carrier tracking 
data and respond to panic alerts generated by 
carriers as well as alerts resulting from carrier 
violation of TTC-established geo-fence 
boundaries.
 While the basic concepts of panic alert information 
provided to and process by a TTC was validated, 
additional and significant system re-design will be 
required to improve the functional reliability of these 
processes.
 The HTSP Prototype system had significant 
technical performance issues that would need 
to be addressed before moving to a full-scale 
system.
 In addition to addressing overall system reliability and 
security issues, the system architecture itself should be 
significantly revised so that the sluggish system user 
response issues are corrected; current state-of-the-art 
technology relating to Web information management 
software and Web mapping techniques should be 
leveraged.
 The HTSP Prototype system approach to geo-
fencing will need significant rework to support 
a credible TTC operational capability
 The current geo-fencing software and operational 
approach in the HTSP Prototype system should be 
scrapped. The HTSP Program should investigate the 
state-of-the-art in geo-fencing applications to identify/ 
develop a more robust geo-fencing approach for the
future deployed HTSP system.
 HTSP Staged Event Testing showed a 
substantial series of system operational 
problems related to alert notification and TTC 
communication issues.
 The significant HTSP Prototype system errors in alert 
notification highlights the need for the HTSP program to 
re-evaluate the current system architecture and ConOps. 
The errors further underscore the need to establish a 
formal system engineering and design approach that will 
ensure the development of a more reliable HTSP system 
in the near future, as TSA moves forward with deploying 
a fully operational HTSP system.
 Challenges in tracking cargo 
(trailers/containers) versus power units (truck 
cabs) remain. 
 The HTSP program should investigate the current 
trucking industry deployments of Untethered Trailer 
Tracking (UTT) systems. These systems would have the 
advantage of allowing a future HTSP system to track both 
power units and trailers.
 As currently designed, the HTSP Prototype 
system has significant deficiencies in fulfilling 
expected first responder requirements.
 The HTSP program should establish high-level 
requirements, possibly through a series of regional 
“requirements workshops” in each of the Nation’s major 
regions designed to meet congressionally mandated 
program requirements, while at the same time 
accommodating the needs and requirements of all 
stakeholders.
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Conclusions Corresponding Recommendations
 As currently designed, the HTSP Prototype 
system does not adequately take into account: 
(1) how it would integrate with other 
government security programs and tracking 
systems; and (2), how it would integrate with 
established state/local emergency response 
systems.
 Consideration should be given to how this system “fits in” 
with other systems that are currently in use: (1) 
determine the impact that the system has on other 
systems, as well as how it is impacted by other HAZMAT-
related Federal regulations and programs; (2) investigate 
the functional redundancy and uniqueness of TTC 
operations as related to other tracking programs’ 
operations; and (3), evaluate how the HTSP system could 
be effectively integrated with other Geographic 
Information System (GIS)-based emergency response 
systems.
 As currently designed, the HTSP Prototype 
system does not provide the flexibility to 
accommodate established Law Enforcement/ 
Emergency Response standards and practices 
as well as jurisdictional uniqueness.
 The following three steps should be considered here: (1) 
align the system with the NIMS and National Response 
Framework; (2) ensure the system is adaptable to 
regional communications protocol, terminology, dispatch 
procedures, etc.; and (3),  establish understandings and 
agreements with intelligence agencies, fusion centers, 
and Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) that help to 
coordinate correct information transfer.
 The benefit-cost assessment showed that the 
system could be deployed by TSA, and initial 
operations could begin for a budget in the 
range of $20 million for TSA, which resulted in 
a significantly positive benefit-cost case for the 
public sector. However, despite a credible 
benefit-cost case for motor carriers to deploy 
the technologies, substantial private sector 
investment would nevertheless be required to 
implement the necessary tracking systems.
 If a Federal mandate for motor carriers to deploy HTSP 
technologies is not feasible, then TSA should consider 
innovative strategies that can leverage the deployment of 
the HTSP tracking technologies, such as: (1) lower 
insurance premiums due to reduced levels of risk and 
improved safety from improved incident detection and 
response capabilities; and (2) the creation of a 
deployment incentive tax credit program for the motor 
carrier industry, vendors, and manufacturers.
 To support real-time position tracking, the 
HTSP system may need to receive position 
reports significantly more frequently (perhaps 
every 15-30 minutes) than the current 
industry standard of one report about every 2 
hours. The additional cost to TSA and/or TSA 
of this more frequent position-reporting 
requirement will be measured in the high tens 
of million dollars annually.
 Additional investigation is required to assess methods of 
optimizing position reporting based on HAZMAT load type, 
threat, and consequence information; such optimization 
has the potential to save TSA and/or industry tens of 
millions of dollars annually in potentially unneeded 
communications costs.
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blank page
3.0 Gaps Between the HTSP Technology P
a Tier 1 HSSM Truck Tracking System
This section expands on the IV&V analysis of the HTSP technology prototype with a more 
in-depth look at the gap between the technology prototype and an operational Tier 1 
HSSM truck tracking system.  
It is important to note that the scope of the HTSP project focused on proving that a 
hazmat truck tracking center was technically feasible and that 
could be crafted into an effective and efficient system 
took place before the 9/11 Act directed the TSA Administrator to 
facilitate the tracking of motor carrier shipments of security
was completed before TSA advanced the outl
Highway Security Sensitive Materials (HSSMs)
(SAIs) for Tier 1 HSSMs.  
Appendix B describes TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM SAIs, and describes the elements of a 
regulatory program based on Tier 1 HSSM SAI implementation.
As illustrated in Figure 1.2 on page 3, the HTSP project team began its work in October 
2005.  It had to make basic assumptions about the regulatory context in which a hazmat 
truck tracking program might operate
decisions made by the project team.  For example, the team could not assume that TSA 
regulations would drive “smart truck” technology deployment and data reporting, or that 
hazmat carriers might be obligated to deploy untethered trailer tracking or vehicle 
immobilization systems.  
Many of the “gaps” between the technology prototype and an operational Tier 1 HSSM 
truck tracking system are due to TSA programmatic developments that took place after 
the HTSP pilot program ended.  
It’s important to stress that the analysis in this section should not be viewed as a 
negative reflection on the TSA HTSP project 
TSA HTSP pilot project conclusively met its objective in demonstrating that “smart truck” 
technology could be crafted into an effective and efficient system for tracking hazmat 
shipments.  Because of the HTSP program, 
implementation of a regulatory program with a hazmat truck tracking system at its h
is completely viable.  
It should also be noted that the HTSP project team identified many improvements it 
believed should be made to the technology prototype (refer to 
A number of those recommendations are factored into the 
Also, in addition to fully meeting HTSP contract objectives
development of the Universal Communications Interface (UCI) was a particularly notable 
accomplishment.  With only minor modification, the UCI can b
operational Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system.  
This section identifies “gaps” between the HTSP technology pilot an operational Tier 1 
HSSM truck tracking system.
3.1 The HTSP technology prototype 
was not built to support a Tier 1 
HSSM regulatory program based 
on Security Action Item 
compliance. 
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rototype and 
“smart truck” technology 
for tracking hazmat shipments.  It 
develop a program to 
-sensitive materials.  It also 
ines of a regulatory strategy for Tier 1 
by issuing voluntary Security Action Items 
, and this factored significantly into design 
or the HTSP technology prototype.   The 
TSA is now able to state with confidence that 
eart 
Section 1.13, page 33).  
analysis under this section.  
the project team’s 
e incorporated into an 
 TSA Tier 1 HSSM guidance was issued June 2008 
completion of the TSA HTSP project.
 The technology pilot was not designed with Security Action 
Item compliance in mind.
 Much of the functionality needed to support a Tier 1 HSSM 
Security Action Item compliance program is not built into 
the technology pilot.
– after 
The HTSP project was hugely 
successful in that it proved that a 
hazmat truck tracking center is 
feasible from a technology 
perspective.
The objective of the HTSP project 
was to prove that a hazmat truck 
tracking center was technically 
feasible.
The HTSP project was completed 
before TSA issued its Tier 1 
HSSM Security Action Item 
guidance.
The IV&V contractor evaluated 
the HTSP technology prototype.
3.2 Outdated and/or underpowered 
tools (GIS, collaboration, web 
services) were used to build the 
HTSP technology prototype. 
3.3 The technology prototype’s alert 
notification and communications 
functions were degrade
architectural design flaws.
3.4 The concept of operations 
underlying the HTSP technology 
prototype was flawed and 
substantially incomplete and did 
not reflect the critical role of states 
and other parties in securing the 
hazmat supply chain.
                                                          
1Wikipedia defines a Public Safety Answering Point
telephone number for police, firefighting, and 
dispatching these emergency services. Most PSAPs are now capable of 
phone locations as well, where the mobile phone company
where outgoing voice mail can be sent to many 
chemical spill.
In the United States, the county or a large 
generally bound to provide this and other emergency services even within the 
out and have its own system, sometimes along with a 
particular emergency service (for example, city police but county fire), it may be necessary to 
handle that type of call. The U.S. requires caller location capability on the part of all 
there is no federal law requiring PSAPs to be able to receive such information.
There are roughly 6100 primary and secondary PSAPs in the U.S.. Personnel working for PSAPs c
National Emergency Number Association (NENA). Emergency dispatchers working in PSAPs can become 
Academies of Emergency Dispatch (NAED), and a PSAP can become an NAED 
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 Refer to Appendix B – SAIs of particular note where 
supporting functionality is lacking or inadequate
SAI#13, SAI#17, SAI#18, SAI#21, SAI#22, SAI#23
 Less capable versions of ESRI GIS software was used to 
build the technology prototype limiting functionality and 
efficiency of the application.
 Collaboration options in the technology prototype were 
limited.  There was too much reliance on telephone 
communication in the HTSP concept of operations.
d by 
 The IV&V contractor documented significant syst
alert notification highlighting the need to re
current system architecture and concept of operations.
 The errors detected in the technology prototype testing 
underscored the need to establish 
engineering/design approach that will ensure the 
development of a more reliable operational system.
 Only one business process was developed in the HTSP 
driver panic button alert.  Many more are needed (see 3.8).  
The concept of operations plan focused on this alert being 
distributed to a local public safety answering point (PSAP)
for action, bypassing state fusion centers.
 Hazardous materials management is a state
program.  In most states, the states – not DOT or TSA 
responsible for the direct regulation and oversight of hazmat 
carriers.  Bypassing state authorities to reach down directly 
to a PSAP will create a serious state/federal relationship 
issue.  Also, with the development of state fusion centers 
throughout the nation, states and state fusion centers are a 
(PSAP) as a call center responsible for answering 
ambulance services. Trained telephone operators are also usually responsible for 
caller location for landline calls, and many can handle 
has a handset location system. Some can also use 
phone numbers at once, in order to alert people to a local 
city usually handles this responsibility. As a division of a U.S. state
municipalities, unless the municipality chooses to 
neighboring jurisdiction. If a city operates its own PSAP, but not its own 
relay the call to the PSAP that does 
phone companies, including mobile
an become voting members of the 
certified with
Accredited Center of Excellence.
– SAI#9, 
em errors in 
-evaluate the 
a formal system 
– a 
1
-delegated 
– are 
calls to an emergency 
mobile 
voice broadcasting, 
emergency such as a 
, counties are 
opt 
ones, but 
the National 
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better coordination point for initial contact in a 
transportation security incident.   They have more capable 
systems and communications capabilities than local PSAPs. 
 There is a need to drive business processes down to the local 
PSAP in the event of a transportation security incident (see 
3.25 and 3.26), but the business processes for doing so 
should flow through state fusion centers.
3.5 The HTSP technology prototype 
relied too heavily on the Universal 
Communications Interface to bring 
data into the TEAMS application.
 The IEEE 1512 standards-based Universal Communications 
Interface (UCI) is an efficient, standards-based mechanism 
for data intake from fleet tracking vendors.
 Section 1.4 provides an overview of the UCI.  Appendix A
provides links to detailed design documents for the UCI.
 The IEEE 1512 standard was developed to support a wide 
range of data exchange needs related to hazmat shipments, 
and hazmat incidents/response.  Not all of these data 
elements were needed to support the HTSP program.
 Hazmat carriers and fleet tracking vendors used the UCI to 
report data to the technology prototype.  Two key pieces of 
data passed through the UCI – vehicle location and driver 
panic button alerts.  Other data originating from carrier 
truck-mounted systems will need to flow through the UCI, 
and the IEEE 1512 standard supports this data flow.  This 
includes alerts from untethered tracking system devices, 
vehicle immobilization systems, and electronic lock/seals.  
The incremental cost for additional data reporting from these 
systems via the UCI is negligible.    
 The HTSP technology prototype attempted to use the UCI as 
the mechanism to capture data on the type and quantity of 
materials in hazmat shipments.  While the UCI could be 
engineered to support this mechanism, it will be much less 
efficient and more costly to implement than an electronic 
manifest (see Section 3.6).  Data submission by the UCI will 
also place a larger burden on Tier 1 HSSM carriers and fleet 
tracking vendors.  Data intake through the UCI should be 
strictly limited to data naturally flowing from truck-mounted 
“smart truck” devices.
3.6 The technology prototype did not 
employ an electronic manifest 
solution that would allow it to 
efficiently accept load, driver, & 
shipment information.
 The original concept of the UCI was that the truck tracking 
center (TTC) would receive a message containing location, 
cargo manifest and event data from the fleet tracking 
vendor. The carrier’s gate out message – routed from the 
fleet tracking vendor to the TTC - would include the cargo 
manifest information and truck identification information. 
During the course of the shipment, the truck would provide
position updates, and provide updated location data and 
alerts (as needed). Finally, assuming normal completion of 
the shipment, the driver would provide a gate-in indication.
 Section 3.5 touched on some of the reasons the UCI is not 
the most efficient mechanism for bringing cargo manifest 
data into the truck tracking solution.  Beyond type and 
quantity of the materials in a shipment, Tier 1 HSSM 
shipping papers (manifests) will include many more data 
elements. The Custom and Border Protection’s ACE truck e-
3.7 The HTSP technology prototype 
user interface was built to serve 
the needs of the security specialist 
that monitors hazmat shipments, 
however, other users also need to 
use the system.
3.8 Only one business process 
workflow was served by the 
technology prototype - many more 
are needed to support TSA’s
requirements for a Tier 1 HSSM 
truck tracking system.
3.9 The panic button business process 
workflow/system in the HTSP 
technology prototype did not work 
effectively and efficiently.
3.10 Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers, 
important external stakeholders in 
TSA’s hazmat program, have 
workflow needs that the 
technology prototype did not meet.
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manifest, for example, has 70 data elements including many 
that would be necessary in a Tier 1 HSSM ma
to push a large number of data elements through the UCI 
would not be possible.
 An e-manifest solution based on XFML e
will be a more efficient and effective mechanism
data on shipment transactions into a truck tracking center.
Refer to Appendix C for an overview of e
 The technology prototype was built with one graphical user 
interface (GUI), the GUI for the security specialist that will 
monitor hazmat shipments.  There will be other truck 
tracking system users beyond the security specialist, 
however.
 Portals for Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers will require 
new user GUIs.  Also, TSA and state fusion center personnel 
will need GUIs to meet their needs.  In addition, internal 
truck tracking center personnel other than Security 
Specialists may need GUI’s specific to their business 
requirements (i.e. watch officer, intelligence analyst, etc.).
 The HTSP project developed only a single workflow/business 
process – panic button alert by a hazmat driver.
 Many more business processes/workflows
in a Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system.   
business processes that would need to be served
following.
o Vehicle off route
o Unanticipated trailer disconnect
o Large jump in shipment risk score
o Unauthorized driver attempts to pick up shipment
 The IV&V report criticized the speed and reliability of the 
panic button alert workflow in the HTSP technology 
prototype.  
 According to the IV&V contractor,
“While the basic concepts of panic alert information provided to 
and processed by a TTC was validated, additional and significant 
system re-design will be required to improve the functional 
reliability of these processes.”
 Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers will be important external 
stakeholders in a Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system.
 As noted in 3.8, the HTSP technology prototype only 
developed one workflow.  Many more wil
nifest.  Trying 
-forms technology 
for loading 
  
-forms technology.  
need to be served 
A few examples of 
include the 
l be needed in a 
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fully operational Tier1 HSSM truck tracking system.  
 Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers will likely use the Tier 1 
HSSM system to perform a number of functions including 
registration, e-manifest preparation/submittal, e-route 
preparation/submittal.  Workflows associated with these 
functions will need to be developed.
3.11 The business rules engine 
effectively applied only one rule.  
The rules engine was embedded in 
a “black box” commercial product 
and rules could not be easily 
authored or modified.
 A business rules engine is essential to developing a dynamic 
risk score for hazmat shipments.  The technology prototype 
demonstrated that integrating a business rules engine in a 
truck tracking system was practical.
 The business rules engine capability in the HTSP technology 
prototype was supplied by the FDFolio™ product.  The 
business rules engine was, however, part of the “black box” 
of the commercial FDFolio™ product and could not be 
configured easily.
 Only one business rule was developed in the technology 
prototype.  In practice, many more will be needed.  
Appendix C discusses the different types of business rules 
engines and how they might be configured in a truck 
tracking system.
 A COTS business rules engine should be integrated into the 
truck tracking center.  It will be less costly and more 
efficient.  Also, given that business rules will be in constant 
flux, an easy-to-edit tool is essential.
3.12 The technology prototype did not 
deploy an electronic route solution 
that will enable route adherence 
monitoring.
 Section 1553 of PL110-53 requires “motor carriers that have 
a hazardous material safety permit under part 385 of title 
49, Code of Federal Regulations, to maintain, follow, and 
carry a route plan, in written or electronic format”.  
 The technology prototype did not deploy an electronic route 
solution that will enable route adherence monitoring.
 The HTSP prototype did not include functionality for 
accepting electronic route plans from shippers or carriers.  
PL110-53 was enacted while the HTSP was underway, and 
electronic route plans were not included in the HTSP 
contractor’s mission.
 But, electronic route plans are critical to a truck tracking 
program.  Without an electronic route plan, a truck tracking 
system cannot track carrier route adherence and geo-fence 
and risk management capabilities of the system will be 
substantially degraded.
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3.13 The technology prototype did not 
support chain of custody monitoring 
of hazmat shipments.
 The technology prototype did not advance functionality that 
would allow system users to preserve and document chain of 
custody control of hazmat shipments.
 While chain of custody monitoring was not advanced as a 
Security Action Item, several SAIs (#17, #18, #20) are 
consistent with the idea that shipment chain of custody be 
tracked.  
3.14 The technology prototype did not 
deploy an untethered trailer 
tracking solution.
 The HTSP prototype did not include functionality for 
untethered trailer tracking (UTT).  
 FMCSA’s UTT initiative was on-going when the HTSP project 
began and the HTSP contractor was not tasked with 
considering untethered trailer tracking in the pilot. 2
 SAI #23 recommends that Tier 1 HSSM carriers deploy a 
truck-based monitoring system that includes untethered 
trailer tracking (UTT) capabilities.  
 The FMCSA has developed functional requirements for UTT 
systems, and it is clear that the technology is suitable for 
implementation as part of a hazmat truck tracking system.  
3.15 The technology prototype did not 
deploy a vehicle immobilization 
solution.
 The HTSP prototype did not include functionality for vehicle 
immobilization.  
 FMCSA’s vehicle immobilization initiative was on-going when 
the HTSP project began and the HTSP contractor was not 
tasked with considering vehicle immobilization in the pilot. 3
 SAI #21 recommends Tier 1 HSSM carriers deploy a truck-
based monitoring system that includes vehicle 
activation/immobilization capabilities.  
 The FMCSA has developed functional requirements for 
vehicle immobilization systems, and it is clear that the 
technology is suitable for implementation as part of a 
hazmat truck tracking system
3.16 The technology prototype did not 
deploy an electronic lock/seal 
solution.
 The HTSP prototype did not include functionality for 
electronic locks/seals.  
 SAI #13 recommends that Tier 1 HSSM carriers deploy 
lock/seal systems.
                                                          
2 FMCSA Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety and Security Systems Technology – Untethered Trailer Tracking Systems 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/systems-technology/product-guides/untethered-trailer-tracking.htm
3  Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration; http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/systems-technology/product-
guides/vehicle-disabling.htm
3.17 The geo-fencing solution in the 
HTSP was based on flawed 
assumptions about the creation and 
use of geo-fences by shippers and 
carriers.
3.18 The database supporting the 
technology prototype was not 
designed to support multiple user 
types, multiple business process 
workflows and the rich 
collaboration environment needed 
in a Tier 1 HSSM tracking program.
3.19 The prototype did not support 
variable location reporting 
frequency by hazmat carriers (2
way communication).
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 The IV&V contractor recommended that the
software and operational approach in the HTSP Prototype 
system should be scrapped. An operational system should 
use state-of-the-art in geo-fencing applications to identify/ 
develop a more robust geo-fencing approach.
 Section 1.10 describes the geo-fencing approach developed 
by the HTSP contractor.  
 The technology prototype approach assumed that system 
users such as hazmat carriers might be allowed to establish 
geo-fences in TEAMS.  Establishment of numerous geo
fences in the truck tracking system has the potential for 
generating an overwhelming number of alerts and false 
positives for Security Specialists.
 The technology prototype also advanced the idea of 
generating a geo-fence around a truck and using it as a 
buffer for detecting when a truck is nearing a critical point.  
In practice, this is an unworkable solution and will create too 
many false positive alerts.
 A more workable concept of operations approach would 
restrict geo-fence creation to state and federal security 
officials.  Also, more frequent location reporting would make 
geo-fence monitoring more viable.
 Every workflow in a system will generate and/or consume 
data.  As noted in 3.8, only one business process workflow 
was served in the HTPS.  More workflows will require an 
expanded database.
 Also, functions such as portals, e-manifests, e
monitoring and vehicle immobilization will require an 
expanded database.
 The IV&V contractor pointed out that the HTSP technology 
prototype did not employ state-of-the-art technology for web 
services and GIS services resulting in sluggish performance 
and poor system reliability.
-
 The IV&V contractor recommended establishment of a two
way communications interface between 
systems and TEAMS to enable the automated increase of a 
truck’s reporting rate.  
 Two-way communications would allow less frequent location 
reporting to the truck tracking center.  Location reporting 
can be automatically increased as the “risk profile” of a 
shipment increases and automatically decreased when the 
risk profile decreases.
 Two-way communications was also recommended by the 
HTSP contractor.
geo-fencing 
-
-routes, UTT 
-
fleet tracking 
3.20 The technology prototype only 
allows a security specialist to 
manage a single incident.
3.21 The technology prototype is 
vulnerable to false positives which 
could overwhelm security 
specialists in an operational 
setting.
3.22 The technology prototype drew 
upon a limited set of data from 
external sources.
3.23 The technology prototype did not 
support collaborative exchange 
with government agencies during a 
transportation security incident 
especially lacking are collaborative 
tools to support state fusion 
centers.
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 There are about 2 million Tier 1 HSSM shipments per year in 
the United States.  This means that a Tier 1 HSSM truck 
tracking center systems will constantly monitor about 
active shipments.
 A business rules engine (see 3.11) will apply dynamic risk 
modeling algorithms to identify the riskiest shipments to 
provide security specialists the capability of monitoring the 
most serious shipments.  
 The technology prototype did not allow security specialists to 
manage multiple incidents – a likely event
technology prototype, the security specialist was equipped 
with a single screen/GUI desktop.  A different setup using 
windows and multiple monitors would allow the sec
specialist to manage multiple incidents.
 Too many false positive alerts would quickly overwhelm an 
operational truck tracking center.  Geo
adherence violations could be particularly problematic.
 The technology prototype did not develop the capability to 
detect and manage false positives.  While not a pressing 
issue in the pilot, full system loading could
failure.
 The technology prototype drew on data from fleet tracking 
vendor systems via the UCI.
 The technology prototype did not, however, draw data from 
external databases during the pilot.  In practice, a Tier 1 
HSSM truck tracking system would actively draw on a 
number of external data sources.
-
 As noted in 3.2, collaboration options in the technology 
prototype were limited.  There was too much reliance on 
telephone communication in the HTSP concept of operations.
 As noted in 3.4, state fusion center collaboration was not 
built into the concept of operations for the HTSP technology 
prototype.  
 The IV&V contractor noted that the HTSP Staged Event 
Testing showed a substantial series of system operational 
problems related to alert notification and 
center communication issues.
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.  In the 
urity 
-fence and route 
cause operational 
truck tracking 
3.24 The prototype’s design cannot 
effectively support the transaction 
volume expected in an operational 
system.
3.25 The HTSP technology prototype will 
not meet the operational needs of 
first responders.
3.26 The technology prototype is not 
National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) compliant and w
not support law enforcement and 
emergency response needs at the 
state/local level. 
3.27 The technology prototype lacked 
intelligence analysis capabilities
3.28 The technology prototype lacked 
security features that would be 
required in a system handling 
business confidential, security
sensitive data.
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 The transaction volume in an operational system will be 
about 2 million shipments per year versus  only a handful of 
shipment transactions in the technology prototype.  
 Even with limited transaction loading, the IV&V contractor 
cited sluggish and inefficient performance by the technology 
prototype.
 The IV&V contractor stated that the HTSP Prototype system 
has significant deficiencies in fulfilling expected first 
responder requirements.
 Collaboration capabilities in the technology prototype are 
limited.
ill 
 The IV&V contractor cited a lack of conformance with the 
National Incident Management System guidelines. 
 NIMS compliance is important to insure that the system will 
support law enforcement and emergency response needs.
.  The technology prototype did not have data mining or 
business analytics functionality.
 Lacking this capability, the ability to anticipate problems 
before they occur is extremely limited.
-
 Lightweight security features were built into the HTSP 
technology prototype.  An operational system will need 
strong security functionality.
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4.0 Tier 1 HSSM Truck Tracking System
Recommendations
Section 3 identified “gaps” between the HTSP technology pilot and an operational Tier 1 
HSSM truck tracking system.  This section provides recommendations for addressing 
those “gaps”.  The following figure lists recommendations and associated “gaps”.
Gaps
(from Section 3)
Recommendations
The HTSP technology prototype was not built to 
support a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on 
Security Action Item compliance. (3.1)
Only one business process workflow was served by 
the technology prototype - many more are needed to 
support TSA’s requirements for a Tier 1 HSSM truck 
tracking system. (3.8)
The The technology prototype did not deploy: 
 an electronic route solution that will enable route 
adherence monitoring. (3.12)
 an untethered trailer tracking solution. (3.14)
 a vehicle immobilization solution. (3.15)
 an electronic lock/seal solution. (3.16)
The database supporting the technology prototype 
was not designed to support multiple user types, 
multiple business process workflows and the rich 
collaboration environment needed in a Tier 1 HSSM 
tracking program. (3.18)
1. Build the truck tracking system to monitor shipments 
of TSA-designated Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive 
Materials in the context of a Tier 1 HSSSM regulatory 
program based on TSA’s Security Action Items.
 Design the tracking system to serve as the implementing 
tool for TSA Tier 1 HSSM regulations (Tier 1 HSSM SAIs). 
Functionality includes:
o Vehicle tracking
o Untethered trailer tracking
o Vehicle immobilization
o Electronic route plans
o Electronic manifests (shipping papers)
o Route adherence monitoring 
o Driver authentication
o Electronic locks/monitoring
o Driver panic button/alerts
 Full satisfaction of PL 110-53 requirements.  Regulated 
parties (system users) will include Tier 1 HSSM shippers 
and carriers and fleet tracking vendors.
 North American coverage; expected transaction volume 
about 2 million Tier 1 HSSM transactions/year.
The HTSP technology prototype was not built to 
support a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on 
Security Action Item compliance. (3.1)
The HTSP technology prototype relied too heavily on 
the Universal Communications Interface to bring data 
into the TEAMS application. (3.5)
2. Incorporate the Universal Communications Interface 
built during the TSA HTSP into the truck tracking 
center but refine it to support a different concept of 
operations plan.
 Dataflow from carriers through the UCI should be 
restricted to vehicle location, gate out/in messages, and 
alerts from on-board sensors.  
 Do not use the UCI as the mechanism to capture load or 
route information.  Use shipper/carrier portals for 
preparation/submission of electronic manifests (load) and 
electronic route plans.
 Do not use the UCI as the mechanism to capture 
corporate information for a particular shipment.  Use 
shipper/carrier portals to capture corporate data .  Draw 
corporate data from the registration database to support 
transaction business processes (e-manifests, e-routes, 
etc.).
60
The HTSP technology prototype was not built to 
support a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on 
Security Action Item compliance. (3.1)
Outdated and/or underpowered tools (GIS, 
collaboration, web services) were used to build the 
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)
The HTSP technology prototype user interface was 
built to serve the needs of the security specialist that 
monitors hazmat shipments, however, other users 
also need to use the system. (3.7)
Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers, important external 
stakeholders in TSA’s hazmat program, have workflow 
needs that the technology prototype did not meet. 
(3.10)
3. Build portals with rich functionality for Tier 1 HSSM 
shippers and carriers; provide 24/7 access to corporate 
and shipment transaction data.
 Build user portals to allow Tier 1 HSSM shippers/carriers
24/7 access to their data and to allow them to efficiently 
implement business processes associated with the truck 
tracking center: e-manifest submission, e-route 
submission.
 Build portals to provide shippers and carriers access to 
shipment transactions: in-progress and completed.
 Every shipper and carrier will have their own portal (“my 
portal”).  Portals will allow company administrators to 
establish corporate user rights.
 Build portals to allow shippers and carriers to complete 
system registration – i.e. load corporate data into the 
system database. 
Outdated and/or underpowered tools (GIS, 
collaboration, web services) were used to build the 
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)
The technology prototype’s alert notification and 
communications functions were degraded by 
architectural design flaws. (3.3)
The technology prototype did not employ an 
electronic manifest solution that would allow it to 
efficiently accept load/driver/shipment information. 
(3.6)
The panic button business process workflow/system in 
the HTSP technology prototype did not work 
effectively and efficiently. (3.9)
The business rules engine effectively applied only one 
rule.  The rules engine was embedded in a “black box” 
commercial product and rules could not be easily 
authored or modified. (3.11)
The technology prototype did not support 
collaborative exchange with government agencies 
during a transportation security incident - especially 
lacking are collaborative tools to support state fusion 
centers. (3.23)
The prototype’s design cannot effectively support the 
transaction volume expected in an operational 
system. (3.24)
4. Replicate data-merge and data-presentation functions 
of TEAMS in a truck tracking system but build it using 
more sophisticated toolsets to optimize speed, 
functionality, and business process workflow.
 Merge information from the electronic manifest, the 
electronic route plan, vehicle location, and alerts to 
answer the following questions (see Figure 1.1).
 What is the truck carrying?
 What is the shipment risk profile?
 Who is driving the truck?
 What is the truck’s location?
 Is there a problem? What?
 What is the truck’s destination?
 What route has the truck followed?
 Is the truck off-route?
 Deploy XFML technology (e-forms) to build an electronic 
manifest application to capture load information.  Access 
via portal.
 Build an electronic route preparation tool to support easy 
preparation/storage of carrier-defined routes.  Access via 
portal.
 E-manifest and e-route tools will draw on corporate data 
captured though registration.
 Use latest GIS and portal (collaboration) tools to support 
development of the truck tracking center.  
 Build to efficiently process expected Tier 1 HSSM 
transaction traffic – 2 million transactions/year.  
The HTSP technology prototype was not built to
support a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on 
Security Action Item compliance. (3.1)
The HTSP technology prototype user interface was 
built to serve the needs of the security specialist that 
monitors hazmat shipments, however, other users 
5. Substantially expand the list of workflows/business 
processes served beyond those currently served by 
TEAMS. 
 The only business process addressed in the HTSP was 
the process associated with a driver panic button alert.  
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also need to use the system. (3.7)
Only one business process workflow was served by 
the technology prototype - many more are needed to 
support TSA’s requirements for a Tier 1 HSSM truck 
tracking system. (3.8)
Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers, important external
stakeholders in TSA’s hazmat program, have workflow 
needs that the technology prototype did not meet. 
(3.10)
The The technology prototype did not deploy: 
 an electronic route solution that will enable route 
adherence monitoring. (3.12)
 an untethered trailer tracking solution. (3.14)
 a vehicle immobilization solution. (3.15)
 an electronic lock/seal solution. (3.16)
The HTSP concept of operations was built around the 
actions that would be taken in the event of a panic 
button alert.
 To support TSA’s SAIs, the system will need to serve 
specific business processes associated with the SAIs.  
For example, what needs to be done if:
 An unauthorized driver attempts to pick up a Tier 1 HSSM 
shipment (SAI #6)?
 A trailer is unexpectedly detached from a tractor during a
shipment (SAI #23)?
 A truck is substantially late or off-route of its expected 
route (SAIs #17,18)?
 An electronic lock is breached during transit (SAI #13)?
 Workflows need to extend beyond the Security 
Specialist desktop to TSA. State fusion centers, 
emergency responders, etc.
The HTSP technology prototype was not built to 
support a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on 
Security Action Item compliance. (3.1)
Outdated and/or underpowered tools (GIS, 
collaboration, web services) were used to build the 
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)
The technology prototype did not deploy an electronic 
route solution that will enable route adherence 
monitoring. (3.12)
6. Incorporate an on-line electronic route plan tool into 
the system for shippers/carriers to use to prepare and 
submit e-route plans via a portal.
 Build an electronic route authoring tool accessible to 
shippers and carriers via their portals.  Use advanced 
GIS tools to build the e-route authoring tool.
 Shippers/carriers can create and store e-routes on-line.  
They can retrieve them when needed and associate the 
e-route with a shipment as needed.
 Electronic route plans must be submitted at or before 
“gate-out”.  The route followed by a carrier from “gate-
out” to “gate-in” will be stored on shipper/carrier 
portals.  
The HTSP technology prototype was not built to 
support a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on 
Security Action Item compliance. (3.1)
Outdated and/or underpowered tools (GIS, 
collaboration, web services) were used to build the 
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)
The HTSP technology prototype relied too heavily on 
the Universal Communications Interface to bring data 
into the TEAMS application. (3.5)
The technology prototype did not employ an 
electronic manifest solution that would allow it to 
efficiently accept load/driver/shipment information. 
(3.6)
The technology prototype did not support chain of 
custody monitoring of hazmat shipments. (3.13)
7. Incorporate an XFML-based electronic manifest tool 
into the system for shippers/carriers to use to prepare 
and submit e-manifests via a portal.
 Build an electronic manifest authoring tool accessible to 
shippers and carriers via their portals.  Use an xfml e-
forms tool to build the electronic manifest tool.
 Shippers/carriers can create and store electronic 
manifests on-line.  They can retrieve them when needed 
to support a shipment.
 Electronic manifests must be submitted at or before 
“gate-out”.  Electronic manifests from completed 
transactions will be stored on shipper/carrier portals.
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Outdated and/or underpowered tools (GIS, 
collaboration, web services) were used to build the 
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)
The geo-fencing solution in the HTSP was based on 
flawed assumptions about the creation and use of 
geo-fences by shippers and carriers. (3.17)
The prototype did not support variable location 
reporting frequency by hazmat carriers (2-way 
communication). (3.19)
8. Scrap the geo-fencing approach used in the TSA HTSP; 
rebuild using upgraded GIS tools.
 Build a geo-fencing authoring tool using advanced GIS 
tools.
 Only authorized state and federal users will be allowed 
to create a geo-fence in the system.
 Geo-fences can have a wide range of attributes.  A 
modeling tool will support analysis of the impact of each 
geo-fence on workload before the geo-fence may be 
loaded into the system.
 Geo-fences must be “reauthorized” periodically to avoid 
being purged from the tracking system.
The HTSP technology prototype was not built to 
support a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on 
Security Action Item compliance. (3.1)
The technology prototype did not deploy:
 an untethered trailer tracking solution. (3.14)
 a vehicle immobilization solution. (3.15)
9. Build the truck tracking center system to support 
untethered trailer tracking and vehicle immobilization.
 The UCI will be the path for alerts.
 Business rules risk scoring will likely push scores up 
high enough to require immediate attention of Security 
Specialists.
 Workflows specifically built for each scenario will 
support investigation/resolution by the Security 
Specialist.
The HTSP technology prototype user interface was 
built to serve the needs of the security specialist that 
monitors hazmat shipments, however, other users 
also need to use the system. (3.7)
The technology prototype lacked intelligence analysis 
capabilities. (3.27)
10. Build desktops to meet the operational needs of 
personnel serving in the truck tracking center including 
security specialists and intelligence analysts.
 Security specialists will monitor shipments 24/7 and 
respond to issues arising with in-transit shipments.  
 Intelligence analysts will react to security alerts from 
TSA and modify business rules to reflect immediate 
issues.  Analysts will also identify issues and anomalies 
in shipments to prevent or mitigate incidents. 
 Other desktops might include a watch commander 
desktop and a user support desktop.
Outdated and/or underpowered tools (GIS, 
collaboration, web services) were used to build the 
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)
The technology prototype’s alert notification and 
communications functions were degraded by 
architectural design flaws. (3.3)
The database supporting the technology prototype 
was not designed to support multiple user types, 
multiple business process workflows and the rich 
collaboration environment needed in a Tier 1 HSSM 
tracking program. (3.18)
11. Rebuild the security specialist’s desktop application to 
support management of multiple incidents and to serve 
collaboration needs with TSA, state fusion centers, 
hazmat carriers/drivers, and first responders.
 Security specialists will likely use multi-screen 
workstations, and will need to be able to manage 
multiple incidents/issues at a time.
 Security specialists need to call upon a mix of 
communication tools to meet workflow needs.  For 
example, if the workflow calls for a conference call with 
TSA and a state fusion center, the Security Specialist 
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The technology prototype only allows a security 
specialist to manage a single incident. (3.20)
The technology prototype did not support 
collaborative exchange with government agencies 
during a transportation security incident - especially 
lacking are collaborative tools to support state fusion 
centers. (3.23)
should be able to initiate the call automatically from the 
desktop.  
 Security Specialists should be able to collaborate 
efficiently with state fusion centers and first responders.  
Collaboration tools need to support efficient workflow 
from the truck tracking center all the way down to the 
field level.
Outdated and/or underpowered tools (GIS, 
collaboration, web services) were used to build the 
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)
The business rules engine effectively applied only one 
rule.  The rules engine was embedded in a “black box” 
commercial product and rules could not be easily 
authored or modified. (3.11)
12. Build a stand-alone business rules engine into the 
truck tracking center using a COTS software product.
 Use a powerful COTS business rules engine as a stand-
alone tool – i.e. not integrated into a “black box” 
application.
 The business rules engine should be easy to modify “on 
the fly” by business analysts. 
 Rule processing – especially alert processing - must be 
almost instantaneous.
The business rules engine effectively applied only one 
rule.  The rules engine was embedded in a “black box” 
commercial product and rules could not be easily 
authored or modified. (3.11)
The technology prototype only allows a security 
specialist to manage a single incident. (3.20)
The technology prototype is vulnerable to false 
positive which would overwhelm security specialists in 
an operational setting. (3.21)
13. Use the business rules engine to support dynamic risk 
profiling and to manage work load at the truck tracking 
center.
 The business rules engine will create a risk score for a 
shipment at “gate-out”.  Risk scoring will be updated 
continuously between “gate-out” and “gate-in”.  For 
example, every location update will result in rescoring 
for a shipment.
 While the application will likely start with a simple set of 
rules, the rules may grow in complexity over time to 
reflect TSA’s risk outlook.
 Rules should always be tested before live loading to 
avoid overwhelming the truck tracking center with low 
priority alerts.
The geo-fencing solution in the HTSP was based on 
flawed assumptions about the creation and use of 
geo-fences by shippers and carriers. (3.17)
The prototype did not support variable location 
reporting frequency by hazmat carriers (2-way 
communication). (3.19)
14. Build 2-way communications capabilities between the 
truck tracking system and fleet tracking vendor 
systems to manage data reporting (variable reporting 
frequencies).
 SAI #23 recommends location reporting every 15 
minutes.  Depending on the risk profile of the load, a 15 
minute reporting interval may be over-reporting or 
under-reporting.
 Fleet tracking vendors’ systems must be able to accept 
an automated request from the truck tracking center to 
adjust reporting frequency. 
 For low-risk shipments in sparsely populated areas, 
reporting intervals >> 15 minutes may be sufficient.  
For high-risk shipments in sensitive areas, reporting 
intervals < 15 minutes may be needed.
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Outdated and/or underpowered tools (GIS, 
collaboration, web services) were used to build the 
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)
The concept of operations underlying the HTSP 
technology prototype was flawed and substantially 
incomplete and did not reflect the critical role of 
states and other parties in securing the hazmat 
supply chain. (3.4)
The technology prototype did not support 
collaborative exchange with government agencies 
during a transportation security incident - especially 
lacking are collaborative tools to support state fusion 
centers. (3.23)
15. Build an interface between the truck tracking center 
and state fusion centers to enable coordinated 
response to transportation security incidents.
 State fusion centers are a key point of contact for the truck 
tracking center, and many business processes will involve 
communication/collaboration with fusion center staff.
 Collaboration must be efficient, fast, and easy.  Automated 
or desk-top initiated communication will be a key feature of 
the Security Specialist desktop. 
 Collaboration must flow through the state fusion center 
down to first responders in the field.
 A state fusion center will have access to its state’s “common 
operating picture” (COP).  The state’s COP will include data 
on shipments originating or ending in the state as well as 
shipments passing though the state.  The COP will feature a 
map visualization of in-transit shipments.
 In the event of a transportation security incident, truck 
tracking systems will automatically initiate contact with the 
state fusion center and “push” information on the shipment 
to the fusion center.
 The truck tracking center will have a “response toolkit” 
available to support the state and first responders in the 
event of a declared security incident, and will provide 
support and assistance until the incident is resolved.
Outdated and/or underpowered tools (GIS, 
collaboration, web services) were used to build the 
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)
The concept of operations underlying the HTSP 
technology prototype was flawed and substantially 
incomplete and did not reflect the critical role of 
states and other parties in securing the hazmat 
supply chain. (3.4)
The technology prototype did not support 
collaborative exchange with government agencies 
during a transportation security incident - especially 
lacking are collaborative tools to support state fusion 
centers. (3.23)
The HTSP technology prototype will not meet the 
operational needs of first responders. (3.25)
The technology prototype is not National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) compliant and will not 
support law enforcement and emergency response 
needs at the state/local level. (3.26)
16. Build a NIMS-compliant communications infrastructure 
that will support efficient collaboration during a 
transportation security incident.
 Truck tracking center systems and business processes will 
be NIMS-compliant.
 Extend business processes/workflows though the state 
fusion centers to emergency responders.
 As noted in #15, the truck tracking center will support state 
fusion centers, local governments, and first responders in 
the event of a transportation security incident.
 As noted in #4, state-of-the-art communications and 
collaboration tools will be used to support the interface 
between the truck tracking center and state fusion centers.
The technology prototype drew upon a limited set of 
data from external sources. (3.22)
The technology prototype lacked intelligence analysis 
capabilities. (3.27)
17. Build intelligence analysis capability into the truck 
tracking center.
 Build an intelligence analyst desktop to support the capability 
to anticipate and prevent security incidents.
65
The concept of operations underlying the HTSP 
technology prototype was flawed and substantially 
incomplete and did not reflect the critical role of 
states and other parties in securing the hazmat 
supply chain. (3.4)
Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers, important external 
stakeholders in TSA’s hazmat program, have workflow 
needs that the technology prototype did not meet. 
(3.10)
The database supporting the technology prototype 
was not designed to support multiple user types, 
multiple business process workflows and the rich 
collaboration environment needed in a Tier 1 HSSM 
tracking program. (3.18)
The technology prototype drew upon a limited set of 
data from external sources. (3.22)
18. Build the truck tracking center to support efficient 
integration with DTTS, TRANSCOM and ACE.
 Integrate the Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking electronic manifest 
with the Custom and Border Protection truck e-manifest.
 Build an interface with DTTS to bring data on military 
munitions shipments into the truck tracking system.  
Similarly, build an interface with DOE’s shipment tracking 
system.
The technology prototype lacked sufficient system 
security. (3.28)
19. Build a strong security infrastructure for the truck 
tracking system.
 Build a security infrastructure to protect business 
confidential and security sensitive information.
 Build a desktop for a network security specialist.
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Appendix A
TSA Universal Communications Interface
1. Universal Communications Interface - Interface Control (Version 1.6)
http://www.tsa.gov/assets/doc/universal_interface_control_document.doc
This document provides the details to enable a commercial truck tracking system to implement the non-proprietary 
universal interface set of protocols that enable the transmission of data from all commercially available tracking 
systems to the centralized truck tracking center.
 Section 2 identifies the Government and non-Government specifications and standards that apply to this 
system specification.
 Section 3 describes the implementation of the universal communications interface.
 Section 4 contains sample universal interface messages.
2. Universal Communications Interface - Interface Requirements 
Specification (IRS) (Version 1.5)
http://www.tsa.gov/assets/doc/universal_interface_requirements_specification.doc
This document specifies the requirements for implementing a centralized truck tracking center and for creating a 
non-proprietary UCI set of protocols to enable the transmission of data from all commercially available tracking 
systems to the centralized truck tracking center.
 Section 2 defines the requirements for the UCI.
 Section 3 identifies the qualification provisions that will assure each requirement from section 3 is met.
 Section 4 specifies the requirements traceability.
 Section 5 contains a listing of all acronyms and abbreviations used, and their meanings.
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Blank
TSA Tier 1 HSSM Security Action Items
1.0 Hazmat security is driving the development of new regulations.
The government’s focus on hazmat transportation has intensified since 9/11.  Prior to 
9/11, the regulatory and legislative primary focus was on hazmat shipment safety.  But 
since 9/11, the federal government has pursued an expanded regulatory and legislat
agenda that recognizes the need to protect the hazmat supply chain from terrorists.
Figure B.1 presents a timeline of regulatory and legislative developments that affect 
hazmat shipment security.  Sections 2.2 
developments on the design and operation of the North American Transportation 
Security Center.
2.0 In 2007, TSA assumed the lead federal responsibility for hazmat 
DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMSA) published a notice in 
the Federal Register on June 27, 2007
Administration has assumed the lead role from PHMSA for rulemaking addressing the 
security of motor carrier shipments of hazardous materials.  
The action was consistent with and supportive of the respective
roles and responsibilities of the Department of
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed September 28, 2004, and
PHMSA as outlined in an Annex to that MOU signed August 7,
The PHMSA also used the Federal Register notice to withdraw an Advanced Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) related to hazmat transportat
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ive 
- 2.5 discuss the implications of these 
Figure B.1 Hazmat Security Regulations and Legislation 
transportation security rulemaking.
advising that the Transportation Security 
transportation security 
Transportation and DHS as delineated in 
of TSA and 
2006.
ion security that the
Timeline
Since 9/11, the government’s 
regulatory emphasis for 
hazmat shipments has shifted 
from safety to security.
TSA has the lead responsibility 
for hazmat transportation 
security rulemaking.
PHMSA had published on July 16, 2002.  The ANPRM solicited comments on a variety of 
security measures that might be required of hazmat carriers to improve hazmat supply 
chain security including the use of vehicle tracking and monitor
warning systems, and remote shut
hold in light of the FMCSA’s Field Operations Test (refer to Section 4.1 of this report) 
and TSA’s Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (refer to Section 4.
shifting responsibilities of DOT and DHS.
With this Federal Register
regulations for hazmat motor carriers.
3.0
Almost one year to the day that TSA formally assumed the lead federal responsibili
hazmat transportation security regulations, TSA issued guidance for shippers and 
carriers of highway security
Assistant Administrator for Transportation Sector Network Management on June 26, 
2008. 1 TSA’s guidance recognizes two tiers of highway security
1. Tier 1 Highway Security
transported by motor vehicle whose potential consequences from an act of terrorism 
include a 
damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption. 
1 HSSM may be found in 
2. Tier 2 Highway Security
transported by motor vehicle whose potential consequences from an act of terrorism 
include 
environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption.
full list of Tier 2 HSSM may be found in 
3.1 
TSA developed its guidance in 
Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) and DOT’s Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration.  The TSA guidance builds upon existing PHMSA and 
FMCSA hazmat regulations including
49CFR172.704 and 172.800 that require hazmat carriers to develop and implement 
security programs and to train employees in security matters.  TSA has, however, 
enhanced earlier guidance to strengthen en
carriers of high
TSA’s guidance is not mandatory for hazmat shippers and receivers.  Shippers and 
carriers are, however, advised by TSA to implement security programs consistent with 
TSA June 26
3.2 TSA recommends more stringent security measures for Tier 1 highway 
As illustrated in 
guidance.  The SAIs 
1. general 
2. personnel security; 
3. unauthorized access; 
4. en-route security.  
                                        
1 Letter to Highway and Motor Carrier Stakeholders; 
Management, US Transportation Security Administration; June 26, 2008.
TSA’s highway security-sensitive 
security guidance recognizes two 
classes of highway security-
sensitive materials:
 Tier 1 which can cause highly 
significant adverse effects 
from terrorist actions; and 
 Tier 2 which can cause 
moderately significant adverse 
effects from terrorist actions.
TSA published Security Action 
Items (SAIs) for Tier 1 and Tier 
2 HSSM shipments.  SAIs are 
voluntary.
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ing systems, emergency 
-offs.  Follow-up action to the ANPRM had been put on 
2 of this report) as well as the 
notice, TSA will be responsible for all future security 
TSA issued guidance for shippers and carriers of highway
security-sensitive materials on June 26, 2008.
-sensitive materials. The guidance was issued by TSA’s 
-sensitive materials.
-Sensitive Materials (Tier 1 HSSM) 
highly significant level of adverse effects on human life, environmental 
Appendix B.  
-Sensitive Materials (Tier 2 HSSM) 
moderately significant level of adverse effects on human li
Appendix B.  
TSA’s security recommendations incorporate earlier DOT guidance.
conjunction with other Federal agencies including DOT’s 
PHMSA’s hazmat safety regulatory provisions in 
-route security measures for shippers and 
-risk materials.
th guidance.
security-sensitive materials.
Figure B.2, TSA listed 23 Security Action Items (SAI) in its June 26
are divided into four categories:
security;
and 
                  
John P. Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector Network 
ty for 
– HSSM 
A full list of Tier 
- HSSM 
fe or health, 
  A 
th
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Figure B.2 TSA HSSM Security Action Items
TSA HSSM Security Action Items
General Security:
1. Security Assessment and Security Plan Requirements.
2. Awareness of Industry Security Practices.
3. Inventory Control Process.
4. Business and Security Critical Information
Personnel Security:
5. Possession of a Valid Commercial Drivers License -
Hazardous Materials Endorsement.
6. Background Checks for Highway Transportation Sector 
Hazmat Employees other than Motor Vehicle Drivers 
with a Valid CDL with HME.
7. Security Awareness Training for Hazmat Employees.
Unauthorized Access:
8. Access Control System for Drivers.
9. Access Control System for Facilities Incidental to 
Transport.
En-Route Security:
10. Establish Communications Plan.
11. Establish Appropriate Vehicle Security Program.
12. Establish Appropriate Cargo Security Program.
13. Implement a Seal/Lock Control Program.
14. High Alert Level Protocols.
15. Establish Security Inspection Policy and Procedures.
16. Establish Reporting Policy and Procedures.
17. Shipment Pre-Planning, Advance Notice of Arrival, and 
Receipt of Confirmation Procedures.
18. Preplanning Routes.
19. Security for Trips Exceeding Driver Hours of Service.
20. Dedicated Truck.
21. Tractor Activation Capability.
22. Panic Button Capability.
23. Tractor and Trailer Tracking Systems
TSA recommends that shippers and carriers of Tier 2 HSSMs adopt the first sixteen SAIs 
and that shippers and carriers of Tier 1 HSSMs, the riskiest materials from a security 
perspective, adopt the first sixteen SAIs as well as TSA’s security action items 17-23.  A 
discussion of TSA’s security action items 17-23 follows.  
Security Action Item #17.  Shipment Pre-Planning, Advance Notice of Arrival 
and Receipt Confirmation Procedures with Receiving Facility – The shipper 
(consignor), motor carrier and receiver (consignee) should conduct shipment pre-
planning to ensure shipments are not released to the motor carrier until they can be 
transported to destination with the least public exposure and minimal delay in transit. 
Shipment pre-planning should include establishing the estimated time of arrival (ETA) 
agreeable to consignor, motor carrier, and consignee; load specifics (shipping paper 
information), and driver identification. When shipments are in transit, the motor carrier 
should coordinate with consignee to confirm the pre-established ETA will be met, or 
agree on a new ETA. Upon receipt of the shipment consignees should notify the shipper 
that the shipment has arrived on schedule and materials are accounted for. Methods for 
advance notice and confirmation of receipt of shipments include electronic mail and 
voice communications. When practical, consignees should immediately alert the 
appropriate shipper or motor carrier if the shipment fails to arrive on schedule or if a 
material shortage is discovered. Methods for immediate alert notifications should be 
made by voice communications only. Where immediate notification is not practical (for 
example at unmanned facilities), the consignor, the motor carrier, and consignee should 
agree on alternate confirmation (method and time) of delivery and receipt. Consignees 
should make every effort possible to accept a shipment that arrives during non-business 
hours due to unforeseen circumstances. 
Security Action Item #18. Preplanning Routes – Employers should ensure 
preplanning of primary and alternate routes. This preplanning should seek to avoid or 
minimize proximity to highly populated urban areas or critical infrastructure such as 
bridges, dams, and tunnels. Policies governing operations during periods of Orange or 
Red alert levels under the Homeland Security Advisory System should plan for alternate 
routing for TIER 1 HSSM shipments away from highly populated urban areas and critical 
infrastructure. The motor carrier or law enforcement officials may determine when to 
implement alternate routing. Drivers should be encouraged to notify the company’s 
dispatch center when substantial en-route deviation is necessary. 
SAI #17 calls for close 
coordination between shipper 
and receiver including use of 
communication systems to 
establish ETA and to track 
delivery schedules.
SAI #18 suggests shippers 
and carriers establish primary 
and alternate routes.  Carriers 
should avoid highly populated 
urban areas or critical 
infrastructure during Orange
or Red alerts.
SAIs 17-23 apply only to 
Tier 1 HSSM shipments.
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Security Action Item #19. Security for Trips Exceeding Driving Time under the 
Hours of Service of Drivers Regulation (49 CFR Part 395) – Employers should 
examine security in light of hours of service available and take steps to mitigate the 
vulnerabilities associated with extended rest stops for driver relief. Examples include 
methods such as constant vehicle attendance or visual observation with the vehicle, 
driver teams, or vetted companions. Other examples include arranging secure locations 
along the route through mutual agreement with industry partners and stakeholders, or 
Security Action Item #20. Dedicated Truck  – Employers should implement policies 
to ensure that, except under emergency circumstances, contracted shipments remain 
with the primary carrier and are not subcontracted, driver/team substitutions are not 
made, and transloading does not occur unless the subcontractor has been confirmed to 
comply with applicable Federal safety and security guidance and regulations and 
company security policies. 
Security Action Item #21. Tractor Activation Capability – Employers should 
implement security measures that require driver identification by login and password or 
biometric data to drive the tractor. Companies should provide written policies and 
instructions to drivers explaining the activation process. 
Security Action Item #22. Panic Button Capability – Employers should implement 
means for a driver to transmit an emergency alert notification to dispatch. “Panic 
Button” technology enables a driver to remotely send an emergency alert notification 
message either via Satellite or Terrestrial Communications, and/or utilize the remote 
Panic Button to disable the vehicle. 
Security Action Item #23. Tractor and Trailer Tracking Systems – Employers 
should have the ability of implementing methods of tracking the tractor and trailer 
throughout the intended route with satellite and/or land-based wireless GPS 
communications systems. Tracking methods for the tractor and trailer should provide 
current position by latitude and longitude. Geo-fencing and route monitoring capabilities 
allow authorized users to define and monitor routes and risk areas. If the tractor and/or 
trailer deviates from a specified route or enters a risk area, an alert notification should 
be sent to the dispatch center. An employer or an authorized representative should have 
the ability to remotely monitor trailer “connect” and “disconnect” events. Employers or 
an authorized representative should have the ability to poll the tractor and trailer 
tracking units to request a current location and status report. Tractor position reporting 
frequency should be configured at not more than 15-minute intervals. Trailer position 
reporting frequency should be configured to provide a position report periodically when 
the trailer has been subject to an unauthorized disconnect from the tractor. The 
reporting frequency should be at an interval that assists the employer in locating and 
recovering the trailer in a timely manner. The tractor and trailer tracking system should 
be tested periodically and the results of the test should be recorded
Figure B.3 lists Tier 1 HSSMs and the number of annual U.S. shipments of each HSSM.
4.0 The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (PL 110-53/H.R. 1) requires 
TSA to take action on hazmat shipment tracking.
On August 3, 2007, President Bush signed the “Implementing Recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Act of 2007”.  This comprehensive legislation consists of 24 Titles 
addressing a broad range of matters intended to enhance homeland security and 
counter the terrorist threat.
The Act is a consolidation of three former House and Senate bills – H.R. 1, which bore 
the title “Implementing the 9-11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007”; S. 4, 
“Improving America’s Security Act of 2007”; and H.R. 1401, “Rail and Public 
Transportation Security Act of 2007.”
Subject areas covered in the Act include homeland security and emergency 
management performance grants; communications interoperability; strengthening use 
of the incident command system; improving intelligence and information sharing and
Congressional oversight of intelligence; preventing terrorist travel; privacy and civil 
liberties; private sector preparedness; improving critical infrastructure security; 
enhanced defenses against weapons of mass destruction; enhancing transportation 
President Bush signed P.L. 110-
53 on August 3, 2007.  It 
includes provisions to enhance 
transportation security.
SAI #19 suggests carriers 
take security precautions 
when trips are interrupted so 
that drivers meet hours of 
service requirements.
SAI #20 suggests that 
carriers should not 
subcontract or transload 
unless the subcontractor is 
security cleared.
SAI #21 suggests that 
carriers user in-cab devices 
that require drivers to log-in 
to drive the tractor.  SAI #22
suggests that drivers have 
access to a panic button (in-
cab and/or remote).
SAI #23 suggests the use of 
tractor and trailer tracking 
systems.  Systems should 
allow for route adherence 
tracking and monitoring of 
trailer “connect” and 
“disconnect”.
DOT Hazard Class Hazmat 
Placard
Division 1.1
Division 1.2
Division 1.3
Explosives
Division 2.2
Non-Flammable Gas (also meeting 
the definition of a material 
poisonous by inhalation)
Division 2.3
Toxic (Poison) Gas
Division 2.3
Toxic (Poison) Gas
Class 3 Flammable Liquids (also 
meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation)
Division 6.1 Poisonous Materials 
(also meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation)
Division 6.1 Poisonous Materials 
(also meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation)
Class 7 Radioactive Materials
Class 8 Corrosive Materials (also 
meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation)
Other Materials
                                        
2 Data on the number of Tier 1 HSSM shipments was provided by David Cooper, Program Manager, Highway & Motor Carrier 
Division, U.S. Transportation Security Administration.  Data represents 2005 proj
select hazmat commodities.
3 This figure includes shipments of Division 2.2 Non
inhalation toxic.  
4 This figure includes shipments of : 1). Class 3 Flammable Liquids (PGI and II in single b
Class 3 Flammable Liquids (any quantity desensitized explosives) 
5 This figure includes shipments of Class 8 Corrosive Materials (Packing group I in single bulk packaging > 3000L or 3000kg)
are not inhalation toxic.  
6 This figure does not include Tier 1 Division 2.2 Non
inhalation) or Tier 1 Class 3 Flammable Liquids (also meeting the definition of a material poisonous by inhalation) 
Corrosive Materials (also meeting the definition of a material poisonous by inhalation)
shipments.
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Figure B.3 TSA Tier 1 HSSMs
Threshold Quantity
Any quantity
Anhydrous ammonia (UN1005) in single bulk 
packaging >300 L or 3000 kg
Hazard zone A & B >5lbs. in a single package
Hazard zone C & D in single bulk packaging >3000L or 
3000kg
PG I in single bulk packaging > 3000 L or 3000 kg
Hazard zone A & B > 5 lbs. in a single package
Hazard zone C & D in single bulk packaging > 3000 l or 
3000 kg
IAEA Code of Conduct Category 1 and 2 materials 
including Highway Route Controlled quantities as 
defined in 49 CFR 173.403 or known as radionuclides 
in forms as RAM-QC by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission
Packing group I and II in single bulk packaging > 3000 
L or 3000 kg
Any quantity of chemicals listed by the Chemical 
Weapons Convention on Schedules.
                  
ections for US domestic and NAFTA truck traffic for 
-Flammable Gases (subsidiary hazard Oxidizer Division 5.1)
ulk packaging > 300L or 3000 kg; and 2). 
– that are not inhalation toxic.
-Flammable Gas (also meeting the definition of a material poisonous
.  Data is unavailable on the number o
Number of Annual U.S. 
Shipments 2
Domestic - 11,868
NAFTA – 524
Domestic - 563,771 3
NAFTA - 6,767
Domestic - 960,871
NAFTA - 8,233
Domestic - 62,015,889 4
NAFTA - 119,816
Domestic - 307,244
NAFTA - 18,213
Domestic - 7,777
NAFTA - 7,265
Domestic - 4,548,595 5
NAFTA - 95,703
unknown
Domestic – 1,287.760 6
NAFTA – 34,235
that are not 
which 
by 
or Class 8 
f these 
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security; preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism; 
international cooperation on security technologies; 9/11 Commission international 
implementation; and advancing democratic values.
4.1 Earlier legislative initiatives paved the way for PL 110-53.
To date, adoption of smart truck technology to protect hazmat shipments has been 
voluntary on the part of trucking fleets.  And, many fleets – especially the larger, long-
haul fleets – have extensive smart truck technology systems in place.  For example, 
Qualcomm – a participant in the FMCSA smart truck technology study – has installed its 
commercial communications and position-reporting technology on more than 500,000 
commercial vehicles.  Qualcomm’s customers include more than 1,500 trucking 
companies, and 34 of the top 35 truckload fleets.  However, even with the commercial 
success of Qualcomm and others, the FMCSA study concluded that smart truck 
technology has not been deployed extensively enough in the hazmat supply chain and 
that the government security infrastructure is not sufficiently developed to provide the 
level of protection the country needs for hazmat shipments.  
A number of regulatory/legislative initiatives have been undertaken by government 
agencies to accelerate the deployment of smart truck technology to protect hazmat 
shipments.
In 2004, the State of California considered legislation (AB 575) that would have 
required all California registered trucks engaged in the transportation of flammable and 
combustible liquids in cargo trucks to be equipped with a GPS system.  The GPS system 
would enable the motor carrier to find the truck’s location at any time.   The legislation 
also required installation of remote vehicle shutdown (RVS) devices on all California-
domiciled trucks carrying hazardous materials.  The RVS devices had to be accessible to 
California Highway Patrol (CHP) officials so that CHP would be able to remotely disable a 
truck by activating the truck’s RVS device.  AB 575 was designed to give law 
enforcement and fleet owners more control of hazmat trucks in the event of a hijacking 
by a terrorist or a mentally unstable individual.
The bill had particularly strong support from California’s law enforcement community –
especially the California Highway Patrol.  CHP’s support of the bill was due, in part, to an 
incident that occurred in early 2001.  In that incident, a driver slammed an 18-wheeler 
into California’s state Capitol building.  The driver – an ex-convict and mental patient –
was killed in the crash.  The truck was destroyed by fire and $10million in damage was 
done to the Capitol building.  According to CHP officials, had the truck been carrying a 
flammable or explosive substance, the entire Capitol building would have been 
destroyed.   AB 575 passed easily in the state assembly but was sidetracked in the 
California senate in the face of opposition by the trucking industry which argued that it 
would place too much financial burden on hazmat transporters and that too little thought 
had been given to implementation, especially related to CHP access to RVS devices on 
the trucks.  California legislators plan to reintroduce the bill in modified form in the 
future.  
The need to protect the hazmat supply chain has captured the attention of U.S. 
legislators.  In the 108th Congress, the United States Senate considered an 
amendment introduced by Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) to the Department of
Homeland Security’s appropriations bill that would have required:
1. trucks transporting hazardous materials to be equipped with global positioning 
satellite (GPS) tracking devices; and
2. written route plans to be prepared and filed with DHS prior to transporting 
hazardous materials.  
Noting the growing preference of terrorists to use truck bombs in their attacks, Schumer 
remarked on the Senate floor, 
...”You can buy a car and pay a couple hundred bucks more and have a GPS system which 
tells exactly where the vehicle is. Wouldn’t it make sense that every truck carrying hazardous 
material was required to have such a GPS system? That would mean if the truck were stolen, 
if the truck were taken to a far different location than where it should be and the company 
wished to find out where it was, we could find it in a minute.”
Since 9/11 federal legislators 
have become concerned about 
the use of hazmat shipments as 
weapons of mass destruction.
Use of smart truck technology 
is voluntary, but legislative & 
regulatory pressure for 
mandatory deployment is 
increasing.
In 2004, California considered 
requiring all hazmat 
transporters to install GPS and 
remote vehicle shutdown 
devices on their trucks.
AB 575 was opposed by the 
trucking industry and was 
tabled in the California Senate.
In 2004, the U.S. Senate 
considered an amendment to the 
DHS appropriations bill requiring 
hazmat GPS tracking and written 
route plans.
Schumer’s amendment drew opposition from the American Trucking Associations (ATA).  
The ATA criticized the measure as unnecessarily burdensome and characterized GPS
based tracking systems as expensive and “easily defeated.”  Republicans and several 
farm state Democrats combined to defeat the measure. Sen. Thad Cochran (R
Mississippi), chairman of the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, argued that other measures were already in place to address 
hazmat security, including shipper training and 
research effort by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to test and evaluate a 
variety of technologies, including GPS, for identifying potentially dangerous vehicles. 
The Senate voted 55-34 to table the Schumer amendment, instead adopting a more 
modest proposal from Sen. Harry M. Reid (D
support efforts for identification and tracking of trucks carrying hazmat cargoes and $53 
million to continue and expand upon the background check system for commercial driver 
licenses with a hazmat endorsement.
In the October 2004 issue of GPS World
editor criticized ATA’s opposition to GPS
as being disingenuous and short-sighted. 
“…Ironically, for years a rapidly growing number of trucking companies have been 
outfitting their fleets with just the kind of capability that ATA dismisses as an
vulnerable, and cumbersome mandate, primarily because of the increased productivity 
that results. 
Of course, this is not the first instance of an industry resisting a security mandate. After 
9/11, commercial airlines resisted some suggestions for methods of increasing security 
against terrorists, or argued that the government should pay for these measures.  The 
dissenters usually have some credible reasons for not complying with the directive. 
Privacy. Cost. Bureaucratic burden. Inadequate preparation time. But the unspoken 
motive often seems to come from just not wanting to be obliged to do something. 
It brings to mind the closing stanza of Rudyard Kipling’s poem, “The Lesson,” composed 
in the wake of the disastrous Boer War: “We have forty million reasons for failure, but not 
a single excuse.” 
Clearly, GPS is not a complete solution for the security needs of the U
system. But just as clearly GPS should be a part of that solution. It’s past time to make it 
so. “
In the 109th Congress, Senate Bill 1052 
and co-sponsored by Schumer and others 
Homeland Security and the Secretary of Transportation to develop a 
Sector Response System patterned on the PSRC concept from the FMCSA hazmat 
security study.   The bill was referred out of committee for debate by the full Senate on 
February 27, 2006 and has yet to be scheduled for full debate.   Senate Bil
to survive Senate debates, but it is notable in that it recognized the need for a Hazmat 
Public Sector Reporting Center and embraced the idea that a regulatory “push” 
that implemented in Singapore - is needed to promote smart truck tec
deployment.
4.2 PL 110-53 requires TSA to develop a hazmat truck tracking program.
Section 1554 of PL 110-53 directs the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security, through the TSA Administrator, to develop a program to facilitate the tracking 
of motor carrier shipments of security-
such shipments with technology that provides frequent or continuous communications, 
vehicle position location and tracking capabilities, and a feature that allows the driver to 
broadcast an emergency distress signal.
                                        
7 “Hazmat Keeps On Truckin’,”  October 1, 2004, GPS World
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-
-
Highway Watch® programs as well as a 
-Nevada) that appropriated $2 million to 
, a leading trade magazine, the magazine’s 
-based tracking systems for hazmat shipments
7
expensive, 
.S. transportation 
– sponsored by Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) 
– would have required the Secretary of 
National Public 
l 1052 failed 
– like 
hnology 
sensitive materials and to equip vehicles used in 
  The text of Section 1554 follows.
                  
http://www.gpsworld.com/gpsworld/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=126157
PL 110-53 requires TSA to 
develop a hazmat truck 
tracking program.
U.S. Senate Bill 1052 would 
have authorized DHS/DOT to 
develop a hazmat PSRC; 
regulations would drive smart 
truck technology adoption.
The amendment was opposed 
by the American Trucking 
Associations, and tabled in the 
U.S. Senate.
The trucking industry’s motivation 
for resisting the amendment’s 
hazmat GPS tracking requirement 
was motivated by “just not 
wanting to be obliged (by the 
government) to do something….
…Clearly, GPS is not a complete 
solution for the security needs of 
the U.S. transportation system. 
But just as clearly GPS should be 
a part of that solution.  It's past 
time to make it so.”
Editor - GPS World
October 
2004
SECTION
(a) Communications.
(1) In general.
consistent with the findings of the Transportation Security Administration's
hazardous materials truck security pilot program
Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration and in consultation with the 
Secretary of Transportation, shall 
carrier shipments of security
shipments with technology
(A) frequent or continuous communications;
(B) vehicle position location and tracking capabilities; and
(C) a feature that allows a driver of such vehicles to broadcast an eme
signal.
(2) Considerations.
Secretary shall
(A) consult with the Secretary of Transportation to coordinate the program with any 
ongoing or planned efforts for motor carrier or 
the Department of Transportation;
(B) take into 
hazardous material safety and security operational field test
Motor Carri
(C) evaluate
(i) any new information related to the costs and 
tracking technology, including portable tracking technology, for motor carriers transporting 
security-
operational field test repo
November 11, 2004;
(ii) the ability of tracking technology to resist tampering and disabling;
(iii) the capability of tracking technology to collect, display, and store information 
movement of shipments of security
(iv) the appropriate range of contact intervals between the tracking technology and a 
commercial motor vehicle transporting security
(v) technology that allows t
commercial motor vehicles that can be activated by law enforcement authorities to disable the 
vehicle or alert emergency response resources to locate and recover security
in the event of loss or theft of such materials;
(vi) whether installation of the technology described in clause (v) should be incorporated into 
the program under paragraph (1);
(vii) the costs, benefits, and practicality of such technology 
context of the overall benefit to national security, including commerce in transportation; and
(viii) other systems and information the Secretary determines appropriate.
(b) Funding.
United States Code, as amended by section 1503 of this Act, there 
available to the 
(1) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2008 of which $3,000,000 may be used for equipment;
(2) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2009 of which $3,000,00
(3) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2010 of which $3,000,000 may be used for equipment.
(c) Report.--
the Secretary shall issue a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the
program developed and evaluation carried out under this section.
The TSA hazmat truck tracking 
program must factor the FMCSA 
Field Operations Test results 
into its design (refer to Section 
3.1). 
The law requires TSA to consider 
a number of things including:
 cost/benefit of “smart truck” 
technology deployment;
 ability to resist tampering and 
disabling;
 contact intervals (polling 
rates); and
 vehicle immobilization.
PL 110-53 allocates $7 million 
for the current fiscal year and 
$7 million/year for the following 
two fiscal years to fund TSA’s 
hazmat truck tracking program.
PL 110-53 requires that TSA’s 
truck tracking program be 
consistent with the findings 
of TSA’s Hazmat Truck 
Security Pilot.  
Appendix B - TSA Tier 1 HSSM Security Action Items
1554. MOTOR CARRIER SECURITY-SENSITIVE MATERIAL TRACKING.
--
--Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, 
, the Secretary, through the 
develop a program to facilitate the tracking of motor 
-sensitive materials and to equip vehicles used in such 
that provides--
--In developing the program required by paragraph (1), the 
--
security-sensitive materials tracking at 
consideration the recommendations and findings of the report on the 
released by the  Federal 
er Safety Administration on November 11, 2004; and 
--
benefits of deploying, equipping, and utilizing 
sensitive materials not included in the hazardous material safety and security 
rt released by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration on 
-sensitive materials by commercial motor vehicles;
-sensitive materials;
he installation by a motor carrier of concealed electronic devices on 
described in clause (v) in the 
--From the amounts appropriated pursuant to section 114(w) of title 49, 
Secretary to carry out this section--
0 may be used for equipment; 
Not later than 1 year after the issuance of regulations under subsection (a), 
rgency distress 
regarding the 
-sensitive materials 
shall be made 
(d) Limitation.--The Secretary may not mandate the installation or utilization of a 
technology described under this section without additional congressional authority 
provided after the date of enactment of this Act.
4.3 PL 110-53 requires DHS to evaluate hazmat truck routes.
Section 1553 of PL 110-53 directs the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security to: (1) document existing and proposed routes for the transportation of 
hazardous materials by motor carrier; (2) assess and characterize such routes to 
identify measurable criteria for selectin
(3) prepare guidance materials for state officials to assist them in identifying and 
reducing safety concerns and security risks when designating routes for hazardous 
materials; and (4) complete an assessment
achieved under existing requirements for route plans for explosives and radioactive 
materials.  The text of Section 1553 follows.
SEC. 1553. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS HIGHWAY ROUTING
(a) Route Plan Guidance.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary, shall
(1) document existing and proposed routes for the transportation of radioactive and 
nonradioactive hazardous materials by motor carrier, and develop a framework for using 
a geographic information system-based approach to characterize routes in the national 
hazardous materials route registry;
(2) assess and characterize existing and proposed routes for the transportation o
radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous materials by motor carrier for the purpose of 
identifying measurable criteria for selecting routes based on safety and security 
concerns;
(3) analyze current route-related hazardous materials regulations in the 
Canada, and Mexico to identify cross-border differences and conflicting regulations;
(4) document the safety and security concerns of the public, motor carriers, and State, 
local, territorial, and tribal governments about the highway routing of hazardous 
materials;
(5) prepare guidance materials for State officials to ass
reducing both safety concerns and security risks when designating highway routes for 
hazardous materials consistent with the 13 safety
routing criteria and radioactive materials routing criteria in
49, Code of Federal Regulations;8
(6) develop a tool that will enable State officials to examine potential routes for the 
highway transportation of hazardous materials, assess specific security risks associated 
with each route, and explore alternative mitigation measures; and
(7) transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the actions taken 
to fulfill paragraphs (1) through (6) and any recommended changes to the routing 
requirements for the highway transportation of hazardous materials in part 397 of title 
49, Code of Federal Regulations.
(b) Route Plans.--
(1) Assessment.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of Transportation shall complete an assessment of the safety and national 
security benefits achieved under existing requirements for route plans,
                                        
8 Refer to 49CFR 397.71.  In establishing, maintaining, or enforcing a specific non
the following federal standards:  population density; type of highway;
capabilities; results of consultation with affected persons
routes; alternative routes; effects on commerce
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g routes based on safety and security concerns; 
of the safety and national security benefits 
--
f 
United States, 
ist them in identifying and 
-based nonradioactive materials 
subpart C part 397 of title 
in written or 
                  
-radioactive hazmat route, a state must consider 
types and quantities of NRHM; emergency
; exposure and other risk factors; terrain considerations
; delays in transportation; climatic conditions; and congestion and accident histor
response 
; continuity of 
y.
PL 110-53 requires DHS to 
evaluate truck transportation 
routes for radioactive and 
nonradioactive hazardous 
materials.
PL 110-53 requires DHS to 
develop a tool that will enable 
State officials to examine 
potential hazmat routes and to 
assess security risks associated 
with each route.
Under PL 110-53 DOT must 
require motor carriers subject to 
FMCSA’s hazardous material 
safety permitting requirements 
to maintain, follow, and carry a 
route plan in written or 
electronic format.
electronic format, for explosives and radioactive materials. The assessment shall, at a 
minimum--
(A) compare the percentage of Department of Transportation recordable incidents and 
the severity of s
which such route plans are required with the percentage of recordable incidents and the 
severity of such incidents for shipments of explosives and radioactive materials not 
subject to such route plans; and
(B) quantify the security and safety benefits, feasibility, and costs of requiring each 
motor carrier that is required to have a hazardous material safety permit under part 385 
of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, to maintain, f
that meets the requirements of section 397.101 of that title when transporting the type 
and quantity of hazardous materials described in section 385.403, taking into account 
the various segments of the motor carrier indus
less than truckload carriers.
(2) Report.--
of Transportation shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees 
containing the findings and conclusions of the assessment.
(c) Requirement.
material safety permit under part 385 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, to 
maintain, follow, and carry a route plan, in written or electronic format
requirements of section 397.101 of that title when transporting the type and quantity of 
hazardous materials described in section 385.403 if the Secretary determines, under the 
assessment required in subsection (b), that such a requirement would enhance se
and safety without imposing unreasonable costs or burdens upon motor carriers.
4.4
PL 110-53 requires TSA to develop its hazmat tracking program to be consistent with 
the findings of TSA’s Hazmat Truck Security Pilot.  The TSA Hazmat Truck Security Pilot 
was completed April 2008 and is described in 
25, 2008, the project team met with representatives of TSA’s 
Network Management Branch of the
team was provided with a document describing TSA’s high
H.R. 1.  It is included in this report as 
In its plan for implementing H.R. 1, TSA stated that its Hazmat Truck Security Pilot 
demonstrates the feasibility of implementing a hazmat truck tracking program.
“The pilot project has shown that the
has demonstrated a prototype for a centralized truck tracking center.  The truck 
tracking center was used to coordinate incident response with appropriate first 
responders and a government intelligence ope
center system collected data in real
field.  Upon receiving an alert notification or upon detection of an abnormal condition, 
truck tracking center dispatchers helped ma
and coordinating responses to transportation security incidents.”
Furthermore, TSA pointed out in its plan that its Hazmat Truck Security Pilot established 
the foundation for satisfying the three general requirements of §1554(a)(1) of H.R. 1.
 Frequent or continuous communications
protocols that are capable of interfacing with (a) existing truck tracking systems, (b) 
state/local law enforcement agencies and first responders and (c) with federal 
intelligence and emergency management centers.
 Vehicle position location and tracking capabilities
tested and functioning truck tracking center that allows TSA to “continually” monitor 
truck locations and track load types in all of the continental United States.
 A feature that allo
distress signal
TSA’s Hazmat Truck Security 
Pilot has proven that a hazmat 
tracking program is feasible.  
TSA believes the pilot program 
has established a solid 
foundation for implementing PL 
110-53. 
TSA has prepared a high-level 
implementation plan to meet its 
legislative responsibilities under 
PL 110-53; TSA will enhance the 
functionality of the pilot program 
prototype.
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uch incidents for shipments of explosives and radioactive materials for 
ollow, and carry such a route plan 
try, including tank truck, truckload and 
Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
--The Secretary shall require motor carriers that have a hazardous 
  TSA plans to expand on the Hazmat Truck Security 
Section 4.2 of this report.  On Februar
Transport
Highway Motor Carrier Programs Office
-level plan for implementing 
Appendix C.  
transition from pilot to program is feasible.  It 
rations center.  The truck tracking 
-time from carrier-operated systems utilized in the 
nage the process of notifying stakeholders 
– TSA has developed a set of tested 
– TSA has implemented a 
ws a driver of such vehicles to broadcast an emergency 
– TSA has developed a concept of operations that has gone 
, that meets the 
curity 
Pilot program.
y 
ation Sector 
.  The project 
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through considerable testing and being vetted by government and industry 
volunteers.  This concept of operations facilitates effective responses to drivers’ 
emergency distress signals.
TSA plans to take the following actions as a follow-up to the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot:
1. further develop its standards-based communications interface to adapt to evolving 
technical and functional requirements;
2. fully develop and implement a scalable truck tracking center to function as a central 
operations control area to (i) collect data from motor carriers, (ii) monitor events 
and coordinate a response, and (iii) facilitate communications to support a 
coordinated response; and
3. further refine the systems and algorithms that provide the foundation of truck 
tracking center system’s risk-based approach to transportation event management.
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Appendix C
Truck Tracking Center Technology
XFML(Electronic) Forms
Electronic forms (e-forms) are increasingly replacing inefficient and labor-intensive 
paper forms in government and industry.  The Electronic Signatures in Global and 
National Commerce Act of 2000, also known as the E-Sign law, gave digital signatures 
the same legal weight as those signed on paper.  The E-Sign Law allowed government 
and private organizations to place more of their business processes on-line including 
those that require legally binding signatures.  E-Sign has also supported the 
development of e-forms software to support on-line business transactions.
Electronic (XFML) forms satisfy public and private digital business needs.1
Forms are vital components of most organizations’ business processes. They are the 
interface point between people and processes, and they supply information to the 
applications that drive the business.  Forms are significant factors in determining how 
efficiently a process works – and in turn, how smoothly an entire business operates.  
Companies such as Adobe, Microsoft, and IBM have developed sophisticated e-forms 
software to connect documents, people, and business processes.  Paul Chan, Program 
Director for IBM Lotus Forms, offers the following perspective on the use of e-forms in 
the organization.
“A form is a living, breathing transactional document that interacts with users and 
information and systems across the enterprise.  Today more than 80% of the processes 
in public and private businesses depend on forms. In each case the form is what initiates 
the process, it’s the vehicle that drives the process through its lifecycle and that kicks off 
other related processes, and it’s the surviving record of all approvals and transactions 
once the process is complete.  It follows that to have any appreciable impact on 
operational cost and efficiency, an electronic forms solution has to interact with just 
about every client and every back-end system in the organization.”
An e-form is much more than an on-line alternative to a paper form.  An e-form is a 
rich, intelligent, time- and cost-saving front end to an organization’s on-line business 
processes.  E-forms software allows organizations to develop secure and intelligent 
online forms, deploy them to virtually any client, and integrate them with back-end 
systems and services.  
An e-form, often referred to as an XFML e-form, is made up of four XML components –
1).  Presentation (look & layout); 2). Business logic; 3). Data; and 4). XML attachments.  
E-forms software provides a single envelope for all four XML components, and one of the 
most important features of e-forms is that the XML components of the form are not 
disaggregated as the e-form is processed by the system.  For example, when a user 
applies a digital signature to an e-form, e-form software “locks” the signature to the 
form exactly as it appeared when the user signed it, and stores that signed version of 
the form in the database.  This is particularly important when multiple & sequential 
signatures are applied to a form and the form has regulatory or legal importance (i.e. 
hazardous waste manifest form).
E-forms serve business processes and the workflow associated with business processes.  
Dynamic e-forms can be deployed to match workflow needs.  Security features keep 
transactions safe and ensure that data is not tampered with. Entire e-form records may 
be compressed and stored and data from e-forms flow directly into system databases.  
                                                          
1 This discussion is based on whitepapers published by IBM describing IBM’s Lotus Forms product.  Lotus Forms is an e-forms 
product based on XML/XFDL technology.  It has the functionality that would be needed in an XML e-forms product that would meet 
the business requirements of the hazardous waste e-manifest process.  For an overview of e-forms and Lotus Forms: http://www-
01.ibm.com/software/lotus/products/forms/ For an introduction to document security:
http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg27006755&aid=1
“(An e-form) is a living, 
breathing transactional 
document that interacts with 
users and information and 
systems across the enterprise.”   
Paul Chan, IBM
The Electronic Signatures in 
Global and National Commerce 
Act of 2000 enabled digital 
signatures/electronic forms to 
replace paper-based 
transactions.
An e-form’s XML components 
are not ‘disaggregated’ as the e-
form is processed through an 
application’s workflow – a major 
advantage of e-forms.
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One of the biggest advantages of an online form, compared to a paper form, is the 
ability to build “intelligence” into the online form. XFML forms can provide sophisticated 
error checking as the user fills out the form, preventing possible errors (and wasted time 
as incomplete or erroneous forms are returned to the sender). 
E-forms create great value for organizations.  For example, the U.S. Army is in the 
process of a large-scale project to convert its inventory of 100,000 forms used by 1.4 
million people from a paper-based system to an e-forms system using IBM’s Workplace 
Forms™ technology.  Internal Army auditors estimate the Army will save $1.3 billion per 
year when the project is completed.2
Digital signatures ensure document integrity and prevent signature repudiation by 
system users.
In the on-line environment, document security is critical for applications that focus on 
the delivery, routing, storing and viewing of documents (e.g. electronic forms).  
Document security in the on-line environment is a function of a system’s ability to 
maintain document: 1). authentication; 2). authorization; 3). confidentiality; and 4). 
integrity.
Authentication involves verification of the identification of a user. This is typically 
performed at a system level rather than a document level for document access, although 
there are two points at which a user’s identity is critical – when users access documents, 
and when documents containing digital signatures are assessed.  At both points it is 
critical to ensure that the user is positively identified.  System authentication is normally
handled by standard web or network-based authentication protocols (i.e., mutual SSL 
authentication or Windows Network authentication). This type of authentication can 
enable a system to make authorization decisions.  Document-level authentication can 
also be useful, when the document format permits. Certain types of e-form documents 
have the capacity to embed decision logic that can detect and respond to an 
authenticated user via a digital signature or information passed into the document from 
server-side processes.  
A digital signature is created by using a third-party-issued digital certificate. The digital 
certificate must be provided to the user in such a way as to ensure adequate assurance 
of the user’s actual identity. Many organizations use company-issued cards on which the 
signing certificate is stored or have security policies in place regarding the issuance of 
purely electronic certificates.  Information from either the certificate or server-side 
authentication can be used by logic built into the document to restrict access to parts of 
the document, determine which portions are visible, and block write-access to portions 
as required if a user is not authenticated properly.  Authentication that will be used for 
multiple levels of access should contain information on access level or role. This 
information can be embedded within a user’s digital certificate or stored on a central 
server and linked to the user’s ID.
Authorization is closely linked to authentication, and encompasses the process by 
which a user or user level is permitted access to different levels or parts of an 
application.  The degree of authorization complexity and security will depend on the 
application. Typically, applications that define a hierarchical role structure require more 
complex authorization procedures, in which not only is the user identified, but 
credentials for the current access level are analyzed also.
Authorization can also occur at various places in an application. Most applications will 
require authorization for user login, document access, document submission, data 
queries, and so on. With the exception of user login, most of these authorizations are
transparent to the user (single sign-on). Single sign-on systems can be extended to use 
within the context of the document itself. Document formats that support internal logic 
can make decisions regarding which sections of a document are available to the user. 
This is typically accomplished by server-side insertion of session sign-on information into 
the document or by embedding the document in HTML for portal use.  The advantages of 
in-document authorization are mainly in the area of usability and error reduction.  For 
example, sections of a paper form that are to be filled in by someone with manager 
credentials can be made read-only or invisible for someone without those credentials. 
                                                          
2 http://www306.ibm.com/software/swnews/swnews.nsf/n/nhan6h9k99?OpenDocument&Site=lotus
In the on-line environment, 
document security is a function 
of: 
 authentication; 
 confidentiality; 
 authorization; and 
 integrity.
Authentication - How do you 
know where the document came 
from?  
Authorization - What permissions 
does the user have for working 
with the document?
Intelligence can be programmed 
into e-forms to help users avoid 
errors.
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This makes multi-stage documents significantly less error-prone, as well as easier for all 
users.  In-document authorization can also allow for sensitive information to be 
contained in a document but not available to every user of that document. 
Confidentiality refers to the ability of the system or document to restrict the access of 
data to authorized users. Data may be in the form of documents or http-based streams 
(or both).  Confidentiality assures that no-one can see or copy the data without the 
knowledge or permission of the system.
Confidentiality is typically provided through encryption of document or data, and is 
employed throughout a system. The majority of applications implement transmission 
confidentiality through the use of secure socket layer (SSL) to encrypt any user-to-
server or web services-based communications.  As an added layer of confidentiality, it is 
possible to implement document encryption using a public/private key methodology to 
ensure that only the owner of the private key can decrypt the document. If the 
document format supports it, it is possible to store the information regarding permitted 
access within the document itself. 
Integrity refers to the assurance that the document being viewed is exactly the same 
as the document a user filled out. This is extremely important in documents that are 
legally binding or have regulatory importance.  Document integrity is implemented at 
the document level but can be checked at various points throughout the system.
Document integrity is typically implemented by use of a digital signature, which is 
generated by a document hash combined with information from the signer’s digital 
certificate – usually a private key.  Biometric information can also be used to generate 
the digital signature.  Many document formats provide only full-document signing 
capabilities; that is, the user can sign the whole document at once, typically when it has 
been completed. This type of document integrity is best for single-user documents, since 
signatures can only be applied to the whole document.  Other document formats support 
multi-stage and overlapping signatures (as well as whole-document signing).  A user 
may fill out part of a form, sign that part, then send the form to another user who can 
fill out and sign another part of it. The second user’s signature can also cover the first 
user’s, which would prevent the first user from subsequently altering anything. This 
flexibility most closely approaches the process that most forms-based processes 
naturally follow. It also provides the capability to ensure step-by-step document 
integrity, rather than simply end-product document integrity.  
Digital signatures can be used to ensure the integrity of the document by locking all 
items covered by the signature. Changes to fields or other input items cannot be made 
once a signature has been applied. Other changes (data, positioning, formatting, 
visibility, overlap of other elements, etc.) also cannot be made without invalidating that 
signature on the document. Once the form has been signed by a user, it can also be 
notarized by an automatic process on the server side for increased assurance of 
document integrity.  Digital signatures also prevent an individual who has signed a 
document from denying the signature (non-repudiation).
Business Rules Engines3
A business rules engine is a software system that executes one or more business rules
in a runtime production environment. The rules might come from regulation ("hazmat
carriers without a CDL cannot accept a hazmat shipmet"), company policy ("only carriers 
authorized by the company can accept a hazmat shipment"), or other sources (“carriers 
of a high-hazard material that cross geofence #267 will trigger a system alert”).
Rule engine software is commonly provided as a component of a business rule 
management system which, among other functions, provides the ability to: register, 
define, classify, and manage all the rules, verify consistency of rules definitions (”high 
risk hazmat carriers must report vehicle location every x minutes when it is within y 
miles of a tunnel” and “high risk hazmat carriers must reporting frequency may not 
exceed 15 minutes” ), define the relationships between different rules, and relate some
                                                          
3  This discussion is adapted from the Wikipedia article, Business Rules Engine  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_engine
Confidentiality - Who is allowed 
access to the document?
Integrity - How do you know if 
the document has been 
altered?
Digital signatures ensure 
document integrity, and 
prevent signature repudiation 
by system users.
Business rule engines allow 
developers to separate 
business rules from application 
code.  This is important when 
rules change often.
Appendix C – Truck Tracking Center Technology
of these rules to IT applications that are affected or need to enforce one or more of the 
rules.
In any IT application, business rules change more frequently than the rest of the 
application code. Rules engines (or inference engines) are the pluggable software 
components that execute business rules that have been separated from application code 
as part of a business rules approach. This allows the business users to modify the rules 
frequently without the need of IT intervention and hence allows the applications to be 
more adaptable with the dynamic rules.
Many organizations' rules efforts combine aspects of what is generally considered work-
flow design with traditional rule design. This failure to separate the two approaches can 
lead to problems with the ability to re-use and control both business rules and 
workflows. Design approaches that avoid this quandary separate the role of business 
rules and work flows.
Business rules produce knowledge; work flows perform business work. Concretely, that 
means that a business rule may do things like detect that a business situation has 
occurred and raise a business event (typically carried via a messaging infrastructure) or 
create higher level business knowledge (e.g., evaluating the series of organizational, 
product, and regulatory-based rules). On the other hand, a work flow would respond to 
an event by initiating a series of activities.
This separation is important because the same business judgment or business event can 
be reacted to by many different work flows. Embedding the work done in response to 
rule-driven knowledge creation into the rule itself greatly reduces the ability of business 
rules to be reused across an organization because it makes them work-flow specific.
To deliver this type of architecture it is essential to establish the integration between a 
BPM (Business Process Management) and BRM (Business Rules Management) platform 
that is based upon processes responding to events or examining business judgments 
that are defined by business rules. There are some products in the marketplace that 
provide this integration natively. In other situations this type of abstraction and 
integration will have to be developed within a particular project or organization.
Most Java-based rules engines provide a technical call-level interface, based on the JSR-
94 application programming interface (API) standard, in order to allow for integration 
with different applications, and many rule engines allow for service-oriented integrations 
through Web-based standards such as WSDL and SOAP.
Most rule engines supply the ability to develop a data abstraction that represents the 
business entities and relationships that rules should be written against. This business 
entity model can typically be populated from a variety of sources including XML, POJOs, 
flat files, etc. There is no standard language for writing the rules themselves. Many 
engines use a Java-like syntax, while some allow the definition of custom business 
friendly languages.
Most rules engines function as a callable library. However, it is becoming more popular 
for them to run as a generic process akin to the way that RDBMSs behave. Most engines 
treat rules as a configuration to be loaded into their process instance, although some are 
actually code generators for the whole rule execution instance and others allow the user 
to choose.
There are two different classes of rule engines, both of which are usually forward 
chaining. The first class processes so-called production/inference rules. These types of 
rules are used to represent behaviors of the type IF condition THEN action. For example, 
such a rule could answer the question: "Should TSA declare a transportation security 
incident?" by executing rules of the form "IF some-condition THEN allow-customer-a-
mortgage".
The other type of rule engine processes so-called reaction/Event Condition Action rules. 
The reactive rule engines detect and react to incoming events and process event 
patterns. For example, a reactive rule engine could be used to alert a watch officer that 
an unusually high number of dangerous hazmat shipments are moving toward an urban 
area.
Business rules produce 
knowledge; work flows perform 
business work.
A business rule will detect that 
a business situation has 
occurred and raise a business 
event (typically carried via a 
messaging infrastructure).  On 
the other hand, a work flow 
would respond to an event by 
initiating a series of activities.
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The biggest difference between these types is that production rule engines execute when 
a user or application invokes them, usually in a stateless manner. A reactive rule engine 
reacts automatically when events occur, usually in a stateful manner. Many (and indeed 
most) popular commercial rule engines have both production and reaction rule 
capabilities, although they might emphasize one class over another. For example, most 
business rules engines are primarily production rules engines, whereas Complex Event 
Processing rules engines emphasize reaction rules.
Web-based crisis information management software supports 
“virtual” operations centers.4
Information is of little value if it is not collected, evaluated and used in a timely matter. 
Crisis Information Management Software (CIMS) allows information to be collected from 
a variety of sources and then be evaluated, shared or viewed by any authorized user.  
Most CIMS applications are web-based placing integrated crisis information management 
within reach of most emergency management agencies. Any authorized user with 
internet access can log into an emergency operations center and gain access to the 
support offered by the center.  This “virtualization” of emergency operations centers 
dramatically extends their reach and functionality in responding to an incident.  The 
latest versions of some of these applications support handheld devices such as the 
BlackBerry, Treo/Palm, and the Windows Mobile systems. 
WebEOC™ is an example of one of the commercial CIMS packages on the market.  It is 
a web-based information management system that provides a single access point for the 
collection and dissemination of emergency or event-related information. It was designed 
to aid decision making by providing authorized users real-time information in a user-
friendly format. WebEOC™ can be used during the planning, mitigation, response and 
recovery phases of any emergency. It can also be used by agencies during day-to-day 
activities to manage routine, non-emergency related operations. 
Information from WebEOC™ can be viewed on individual PC's or displayed onto any 
number of large screens. It will display text-based lists and reports in conjunction with 
graphics, maps, video, live TV camera, contact lists and other information needed in an 
emergency situation. All windows are scalable and movable; and any number of 
windows can be displayed on any screen, or any window can be displayed across all 
screens. 
WebEOC™ integrates data, video, messaging, and many other types of information. It 
distributes that information both to individual terminals and to projection screens. It also 
allows for remote access via the Internet for authorized users. Being able to share real 
time information with other agencies in an area can allow for more rapid deployment of 
the regional resources available to emergency managers.
MapTac™, a companion software product, can interface with other standard mapping
applications and provides a tactical mapping capability that offers common or agency 
specific mapping views (fire, police, hazmat, etc). WebEOC™ is configurable at the 
administrator level without need of a programmer. The software can accommodate the 
Incident Command System (ICS) and FEMA’s ESF structure. WebEOC™ offers 
chronological and categorical status boards of one or multiple incident/events with user 
configurable screens. Status reports can be directly input by individual responders. It 
also features a Drill Simulator offering the capability to construct exercises that are 
scenario based. Real-time links to 911 CAD systems are also possible through 
WebEOC™. 
                                                          
4This section highlights a leading CIMS software package, WebEOC™.  It was developed at the DOE Savannah River complex and is 
used by most DOE installations at their primary emergency management tool.  The emergency management agencies in Louisville 
and Lexington both use WebEOC™.  Website: http://www.esi911.com/home/
A production rule engine 
executes when an application 
invokes it.  A reactive rule 
engine reacts automatically 
when events occur.
Crisis information management 
software helps run emergency 
operations centers.  
“Virtualization” of emergency 
operations center allows 
authorized users in the field to 
gain access to information and 
incident management tools at 
the emergency operations 
center.
